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Abstract We study equilibrium in large games of strategic complementarities (GSC)
with differential information. We define an appropriate notion of distributional
Bayesian Nash equilibrium and prove its existence. Furthermore, we characterize
order-theoretic properties of the equilibrium set, provide monotone comparative sta-
tics for ordered perturbations of the space of games, and provide explicit algorithms
for computing extremal equilibria. We complement the paper with new results on
the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the sense of Balder and Rustichini
(J Econ Theory 62(2):385–393, 1994) or Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77(2):330–
353, 1997) for large GSC and provide an analogous characterization of the equi-
librium set as in the case of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Finally, we
apply our results to riot games, beauty contests, and common value auctions. In all
cases, standard existence and comparative statics tools in the theory of supermodular
games for finite numbers of agents do not apply in general, and new constructions are
required.
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1 Introduction and related literature
Since the seminal papers of Schmeidler (1973) and Mas-Colell (1984), on equilibria
in games with continuum of players, as well as their various generalizations including
games with incomplete information in the tradition of Harsanyi (1967), and games
with differential information in the tradition of Balder and Rustichini (1994) and Kim
and Yannelis (1997), the framework of large games has become of the central interest
in both game theory and economics. The technical and conceptual issues raised in the
extensions of the Schmeidler/Mas-Colell frameworks to the incomplete information
or differential games raise few technical issues.1 For example, in large games with
incomplete information, exact laws of large numbers (ELLN) for a continuum of
random variables are typically used (e.g., see Feldman and Gilles 1985; Judd 1985 for
an early discussion of this technical issue, as well as Alós-Ferrer 1998).2 Alternatively,
Balder and Rustichini (1994) and Kim and Yannelis (1997) consider games with
differential information, but still the conditions for the existence of equilibria are
quite distinct from the finite number of players case. In such games with differential
information, only a single state of the game is drawn, but it is observed by every
player with respect to a private sub σ -field that can differ across agents and, hence,
characterizes the private information structure in the game. In such games, the mapping
between realizations of this single state and the distribution of information is taken as
a primitive of the game.
The particular choice of approach to large games with information frictions some-
what depends on the economic problem at hand. For example, the former class of
games involving the private signals has been proven useful to study economic prob-
lems, where agents face random taste or productivity shocks that are payoff relevant.
Differential information games have proven appropriate, when studying economic
problems such as common value auctions, tournaments, riot games, or beauty contests,
where in essence, there is single true state of the world, but that state is idiosyncratically
perceived by different players.
A second (and arguably equally) important strand of the literature in game theory
that has found numerous applications in economics over the last two decades concerns
games with strategic complementarities (henceforth GSC). In a GSC, the question of
the existence and characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not hinge
on conditions relating to convexity and upper hemi-continuity of best reply maps, but
1 See Balder and Rustichini (1994) or Sun (2007) for a discussion.
2 One approach has been to assume a unit mass of agents, but study the ELLN for a special case as in Green
(1994). However, for a more systematic approach to this problem, with a general class of i.i.d. random
variables, alternative formulations of the ELLN require the space of players and structure of appropriate
measures to be studied as in Sun (2006), e.g.
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rather on an appropriate notion of increasing best responses in a well-defined set-
theoretic sense, where actions take place in a complete lattice of strategies. In such a
situation, the powerful fixed point theorems of Tarski (1955) and its generalizations
(e.g., Veinott 1992) can be brought to bear on the existence question. Moreover, in
parameterized versions of these games, one can seek natural sufficient conditions for
the existence of monotone equilibrium comparative statics.3 One additional interest-
ing question that concerns GSC is what are the sufficient conditions for computable
equilibrium comparative statics (i.e., when qualitative and computable comparisons
of equilibria4 are possible in a GSC). Let us stress that an important limitation of the
existing literature on GSC is that the research has been focused on games with a finite
number of players [e.g., see the works of Topkis (1979), Vives (1990), and Milgrom
and Roberts (1990)].
In this paper, we provide a unified set of results concerning the existence, compar-
ison, and computation of Bayesian Nash equilibria in a broad class of large games
with differential information in the spirit of Balder and Rustichini (1994) and Kim
and Yannelis (1997).5 As we focus on the subclass of large games with differential
information that also possess strategic complementarities, we extend the existing lit-
erature on GSC with a finite number of players (e.g., Athey 2002, 2001 or Reny 2011;
Vives and Zandt 2007) to a settings with a continuum of players. In addition, unlike
much of the existing literature (including most of the existing literature we have just
mentioned), we are also able to obtain many of our results in the space of strategies
which are not monotone with respect to the signal (rather, best responses are only
pointwise increasing with respect to strategies of other players as in Vives 1990 and
Van Zandt 2010).6 In the end, this paper is a direct extension of the approach taken
in Balbus et al. (2013) where the authors study large GSC with complete information,
but to extend the results in this latter paper, many new constructions are required.7
We start by studying distributional equilibrium.8 For this situation, we propose
an appropriate notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and verify the existence of such
equilibria in our class of games. What is important about our approach to the existence
3 In some cases, conditions for equilibrium comparative statics can be developed via topological arguments.
For example, see the discussion in Villas-Boas (1997).
4 See Van Zandt (2010) for such results.
5 Therefore, our results relate to those found in Balder (2002), who unifies the approach to equilibrium
existence in large games across different types of models, and Yannelis (2009) who stresses the role of con-
tinuity of expected (interim) utility in the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in games with differential
information. See also Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel (2000) for related results.
6 Keep in mind that a game with finite number of players is a degenerate case of our class of large games.
Hence, we extend the existing results per existence and computation of Nash equilibrium in games with
a finite number of players using our new monotone operator-theoretic methods. However, the equilibrium
strategies need not be monotone with respect to the signal. Therefore, we complement the important recent
results obtained in Vives and Zandt (2007) and Van Zandt (2010).
7 See also recent papers of Greinecker and Podczeck (2014), Sun and Zhang (2014), and Yu (2014) for
related problems.
8 In our definition of equilibria, distributional equilibria are not equivalent to equilibria in the sense of
Schmeidler (1973). In particular, in the case of equilibria in the sense of 1973, we require all agents to
behave optimally (as e.g., in Balder and Rustichini 1994 or Kim and Yannelis 1997). See our discussion
later in the paper for the importance of this difference.
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question is the fact that in general, we cannot use standard arguments found in the
literature on GSC. Similarly, for related arguments per equilibrium comparative statics,
as equilibria in our games do not exist in complete lattices, new tools are needed.
To deal with these technical issues when proving the existence of distributional
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we develop a new application of the powerful fixed point
machinery for chain complete partially ordered sets found in the seminal work of
Markowsky (1976). An important aspect of taking this new approach is that we are
able to obtain our existence results under different assumptions than those found in
the extensive current literature, where authors typically pursue sufficient conditions
related to those studied in Mas-Colell (1984) adapted to large games with differen-
tial information to apply an appropriate topological fixed point theorem. Next, after
proving the existence, we turn to the question of equilibrium comparative statics in
the parameters of the class of games. In these results, we not only prove the existence
of monotone equilibrium comparative statics on the space of games, but we give suffi-
cient conditions for these equilibrium comparisons to be computable. We are unaware
of any results in the existing literature on large differential games where equilibrium
comparisons are computable.
We then turn to the equilibrium in the sense of Schmeidler (1973) and, in particular,
the question of existence and characterization of Bayesian Nash–Schmeidler equilib-
rium in our class of large games. Here, what is very interesting is that in general,
the existence constructions per distributional equilibria based upon 1976’s theorem
no longer apply; rather, to obtain even existence, in addition to having the best reply
maps induce monotone fixed point operators, we must also check additional conti-
nuity properties of our operators in relevant order topologies. To obtain such results
per order continuity of fixed point operators built from the best reply maps, we must
first develop applications of order-theoretic maximum theorems.9 This allows us to
develop a new and novel application of the Tarski–Kantorovich fixed point theorem to
the question of existence and computation of equilibrium. In particular, to characterize
the set of Bayesian Nash–Schmeidler equilibrium, we actually prove a new theorem in
the paper that verifies the existence of a countable chain complete partially ordered set
of Bayesian Nash–Schmeider equilibria in our large games. Using this construction,
we are also able to develop explicit methods for the computation of Nash–Schmeidler
equilibria. It is worth mentioning that none of these characterizations of either distrib-
utional equilibria or Bayesian Nash/Schmeidler equilibria can be obtained, in general,
using the existing topological approaches found in the literature. As before, we are
also able to prove theorems on computable monotone comparative statics relative to
ordered perturbations of the deep parameters of the space of primitives of a game.
Under either definition of equilibrium in our large games, although the assump-
tions imposed for GSC are restrictive, they do allow us to obtain new results for large
games with differential information not found in the existing literature. The remainder
of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce some important math-
ematical definitions we need in the remainder of the paper. In Sect. 3, we prove the
existence of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium, characterize the equilibrium
9 That is, we do not invoke versions of Berge’s theorem directly, rather apply order-theoretic maximum
theorems as in Veinott (1992).
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set, and provide results on equilibrium comparative statics. In Sect. 4, we then prove
similar results for Bayesian Nash–Schmeidler equilibrium. Finally, we provide some
economic applications of our results in Sect. 5. To keep the paper self-contained, auxil-
iary results in order-theoretic fixed point theory, as well as proofs that are not included
in the main body of the paper, are placed in the “Appendix”.
2 Useful mathematical terminology
We first define a number of important mathematical terms that will be used in the
sequel.10 A partially ordered set(or poset) is a set S endowed with an order relation
≥ that is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric. If any two elements of C ⊆ S are
comparable, then C is referred to as a chain. If the chain C is countable, we refer to
C as a countable chain. If for every chain C ⊆ S, we have inf C = ∧ C ∈ S and
sup C = ∨ C ∈ S, then S is referred to as a chain complete poset (or, for short, CPO).
If this condition holds only for every countable chain C ⊆ S, then S is referred to as a
countably chain complete poset (or, CCPO). By [a) = {x |x ∈ X, x ≥ a}, we denote
the upperset (or the “up-set”) of a and (b] = {x |x ∈ X, x ≤ b} the lowerset (or the
“down-set”) of b.
In many situations, we need to work in posets with additional structure (and, in
particular, lattices). A lattice is a poset X such that for any two elements x and x ′ in
X , this pair of elements has the sup in X (i.e., “join” denoted x ∨ x ′), and the inf in X
(i.e., “meet” denoted x ∧ x ′), where the infimum and supremum are computed relative
to the partial order ≥. We say X1 ⊂ X is a sublattice of X if the meet and join of any
pair of elements with respect to X are elements of X1. A lattice is complete if for any
subset11 X1 ⊆ X , both ∨ X1 ∈ X and ∧ X1 ∈ X . A subset X1 ⊆ X is subcomplete
lattice if it is complete and also a sublattice relative to the partial order of X .
Increasing mappings play a key role in our work. We consider both increasing
functions and correspondences. Let (X,≥X ) and (Y,≥Y ) be posets, and first con-
sider a function f : X → Y . We say f is increasing (or, equivalently, isotone or
order preserving) on X if f (x ′) ≥Y f (x), when x ′ ≥X x . If f (x ′) >Y f (x) when
x ′ >X x , we say f is strictly increasing.12 An increasing function f : X → Y is
sup-preserving (respectively, inf-preserving) if for any countable chain C , we have
f (∨ C) = ∨ f (C) (respectively, f (∧ C) = ∧ f (C)). If f is both sup-preserving
and inf-preserving for any countable chain C, f will be referred to as σ -order contin-
uous. Moreover, whenever f is sup-preserving and inf-preserving for any chain C, f
will be referred to as an order continuous map.
10 For further discussion of posets and lattices, see Veinott (1992) and Davey and Priestley (2002). Fur-
ther, for discussions of complementarities, monotone controls, and lattice programming, see Milgrom and
Shannon (1994), Li Calzi and Veinott (1992), and Quah and Strulovici (2012).
11 Let (X,≥) be a poset. By ∨ X ∈ X , we denote the greatest element of X (whenever it exists). Similarly,∧
X ∈ X denotes its least element.
12 To avoid using references to “isotone mapping,” we will often use the more traditional terminology
in economics of “increasing”. In the literature on partially ordered sets, an “increasing map often denotes
something slightly different (e.g., f (x ′) ≥Y f (x) when x ′ >X x for x, x ′ ∈ X ).
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We can also develop notations of monotonicity for correspondences. We say a
correspondence (or multifunction) F : X → Y ∗ ⊆ 2Y is ascending in a binary
set relation  on 2Y if F(x ′)  F(x) when x ′ ≥X x , where Y ∗ denotes the range
of the correspondence and consists of a subclass of subsets of 2Y endowed with
the order relation  that depends on the nature of monotonicity that is defined. In
Smithson (1971), Heikkilä and Reffett (2006), and Veinott (1992), various set relations
 for ascending correspondences have been proposed. For example, for Y ∗ = 2Y \∅,
and A, B ∈ 2Y \∅, we say B ↑ A in the weak upward set relation (respectively,
weak downward set relation denoted by ↓) if for all x1 ∈ A, there exists x2 ∈ B
such that x1 ≤ x2 (respectively, if for all x2 ∈ B, there exists x1 ∈ A such that
x1 ≤ x2). If for such A and B, we have both B ↓ A and B ↑ A, the sets are
weak-induced set ordered. If in addition Y is a lattice, and we define L(Y ) = {A ⊆
Y |A is a non-empty sublattice } ⊂ 2Y , then for A, B ∈ L(Y ), we say B ≥v A in
Veinott’s strong set order if for all x2 ∈ A, x1 ∈ B, we have x1 ∨ x2 ∈ B and
x1 ∧ x2 ∈ A.13
We need to define a number of different notions of complementarities that prove
useful for obtaining sufficient conditions for monotone best replies in the class of
games we study. As many of these concepts have been only recently introduced into
the literature (e.g., in Quah and Strulovici 2012), at this stage, we introduce only the
relevant definitions and defer to later explanations as to how the particular forms of
complementarities are used in our arguments.
Assume (X,≥X ) is a lattice. A function g : X → R is quasi-supermodular on X
if for any two x ′, x ∈ X , we have
g(x) ≥ g(x ′ ∧ x) ⇒ g(x ∨ x ′) ≥ g(x ′), and
g(x) > g(x ′ ∧ x) ⇒ g(x ∨ x ′) > g(x ′).
Further, two quasi-supermodular functions g, h : X → R obey signed-ratio quasi-
supermodularity if for any two unordered x ′, x ∈ X, we have:
(i) if h(x ′) > h(x ∧ x ′) and g(x ′) < g(x ∧ x ′), then
−g(x
′) − g(x ∧ x ′)
h(x ′) − h(x ∧ x ′) ≥ −
g(x ∨ x ′) − g(x)
h(x ∨ x ′) − h(x) ;
(ii) if g(x ′) > g(x ∧ x ′) and h(x ′) < h(x ∧ x ′), then
− h(x) − h(x ∧ x
′)
g(x ′) − g(x ∧ x ′) ≥ −
h(x ∨ x ′) − h(x)
g(x ∨ x ′) − g(x) .
13 In a lattice, a correspondence that is ascending in the Veinott strong set order is ascending in the weak-
induced set order; but the converse is not true. For example, in a standard parameterized supermodular
game where actions take place in X (a complete lattice), if Ψ (θ) ⊂ X is the set of pure strategy equilibria
at a parameter θ ∈ Θ, by Veinott’s version of Tarski’s theorem, θ → Ψ (θ) is weak-induced set order
ascending, but not strong set order ascending (even though all the parameterized best replies of the players
in equilibrium are both strong set order ascending and weak-induced set order ascending).
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We say a family of functions { f (·, s)}s∈S satisfies signed-ratio quasi-supermodu-
larity if f : X × S → R is quasi-supermodular on X for all s ∈ S, and for any s,
s′ ∈ S, the functions f (·, s) and f (·, s′) obey signed-ratio quasi-supermodularity.14
Next, assume (S,≥S) is a poset. We say a function g : S → R is a single-crossing
function if g(s) ≥ 0 ⇒ g(s′) ≥ 0 and g(s) > 0 ⇒ g(s′) > 0 for any s′ ≥S s. We
say two single-crossing functions g, h : S → R satisfy signed-ratio monotonicity if
for any two s′ ≥S s, we have:
(i) if g(s) < 0 and h(s) > 0, then
−g(s)
h(s)
≥ −g(s
′)
h(s′)
;
(ii) if h(s) < 0 and g(s) > 0, then
−h(s)
g(s)
≥ −h(s
′)
g(s′)
.
Finally, we say a family of functions { f (·, s)}s∈S , where f : X × S → R, satisfies
signed-ratio monotonicity , if f (·, s) is a single-crossing function for all s ∈ S, and for
any two s, s′ ∈ S, functions f (·, s) and f (·, s′) satisfy the signed-ratio monotonicity.
Furthermore, function f : X × S → R has single-crossing differences in (x, s) if
Δ(s) := f (x ′, s) − f (x, s) is a single-crossing function for any x ′ ≥X x .
With this investment in terminology, we can now proceed to describe our large
games with differential information and consider the question of existence and char-
acterization of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibria.
3 Distributional Bayesian Nash equilibria
In the paper, we study large games with differential information as in Kim and Yannelis
(1997), but with strategic complementarities. For our games, we begin by considering
the question of existence and characterization of distributional Bayesian Nash equi-
libria and then turn to Bayesian Nash equilibria in the sense of Schmeidler (1973).
3.1 Game description
Let Λ be a compact and metrizable space of players. Endow Λ with a non-atomic
probability measure λ defined on the Borel σ -field L. Actions of the players are
assumed to be contained in A ⊂ Rn endowed with the Euclidean topology generating
the Borel σ -field A on A. We impose the natural coordinate-wise partial order ≥ on A.
14 As the paper is intended for an economics audience, we focus on quasi-supermodularity conditions as in
Milgrom and Shannon (1994). In our settings, these are equivalent to “lattice superextremal” conditions in the
language of Li Calzi and Veinott (1992). As we shall latter note, weaker ordinal forms of complementarities
in our games can be built upon the superextremal class of functions as in Li Calzi and Veinott (1992). We
shall remark on how this is done, when it is not obvious.
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Then let, Λ× A be a product space endowed with an order ≥p satisfying the following
condition:15
(α, a) ≥p (α′, a′) ⇒ a ≥ a′.
Let D denote the set of probability measures on Λ× A defined on the product σ -field
L ⊗ A such that for any ν ∈ D, the marginal distribution of ν on Λ is λ. Endow D
with the weak*-topology and the corresponding Borel σ -field D. Finally, we order
D with respect to the first-order stochastic dominance (henceforth FOSD), which we
denote by D .16
We now turn to describing the information structure of the game. Let the measure
space of states/public signals by a completion of the Borel probability space (S,S, μ),
such that S is a complete separable metric space, and S is its Borel sigma field. We
identify μ with completion measure on S. By Sα, α ∈ Λ, we denote a sub σ -field
of S characterizing the private information of agent α ∈ Λ, and, by the mapping
πα : S → R+ we denote the distribution of agent α ∈ Λ, where πα is such that∫
S πα(s)dμ(s) = 1.
Let A˜ : Λ × S ⇒ A be the set of feasible actions for player α depending on state
s ∈ S. By r : Λ × S × D × A → R, we denote the real-valued ex-post payoff
function,17 where r(α, s, φ, a) is the payoff value of player α, using action a ∈ A, in
state s ∈ S, when the distribution of actions of other players is φ.
Since agents choose their actions contingent on their observable signal, the distrib-
ution of actions will differ depending on the realized state of the world. Let τ : S → D
be a function mapping space S to the set of probability distributions on Λ × A. In
order to avoid confusion, we shall denote values of function τ in state s by τ(·|s).18
In some cases, we must consider the partially ordered set of equivalence classes of τ ,
which we shall denote by
15 Clearly, if Λ is an ordered set, this condition is satisfied, if ≥p is just a simple product order. However,
this condition may also be satisfied even if the space of agents has no non-trivial order. For example, we
can take a product order with a trivial order on the space of players’ characteristics:
(α, a) ≥p (α′, a′) ⇔ (α = α′) and (a ≥ a′).
As shall be clear in the sequel, we do not seek generally equilibria that are monotone on Λ.
16 We say for two measures φ and φ′, we have φ′ D φ iff
∫ f (α, a)φ′(dα×da) ≥ ∫ f (α, a)φ(dα×da)
for every increasing, bounded, and measurable function f : Λ × A → R+. We endow the space of
distributions D with the first-order stochastic dominance ordering D as the applications that we have
in mind involve this partial ordering. It is important to mention the fact that a careful examination of our
results shows that they can hold for other partial orderings on D, as well. We simply need to redefine what
we mean by complementarities under these new order relations.
17 Observe that (Λ,L, λ) is a space of agents characteristics, while Mas-Colell (1984) in his seminal
paper characterizes players by their payoff functions only. We can embed 1984 model into ours using the
following construction: r(α, a, τ ) :=α(a, τA), whereλ ∈ Λ, τA is τ marginal on A andΛ := {α|Λ×ΔA →
R, α is continuous}. Alternatively, we can interpret α as a fixed trait, e.g., α is agent’s income, a ∈ A(α) =
[0, α] is a consumption level and payoff function is of the form: r(α, a, τ ) = u(a, τA) + v(α − a, τA),
where u and v are some increasing functions. See also Khan et al. (2013a,b), who analyze games with traits.
18 Please note that this is not equivalent to a regular conditional distribution, but to a distribution parame-
terized by s ∈ S.
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[τ ] := { f : S → D| f (·|s) = τ(·|s), μ-a.e.} .
The set of all equivalence classes containing only measurable functions will be denoted
by Tˆ . By completeness of measure μ, measurability of τ implies measurability of
τ ′ ∈ [τ ]. We endow Tˆ with the pointwise order Tˆ with respect to the equivalence
classes, that is τ ′ Tˆ τ iff τ ′(·|s) D τ(·|s), μ-a.e. In addition, let
TˆΛ :=
{
τ ∈ Tˆ
∣
∣
∣τ
({
(α, a) ∈ Λ × A∣∣a ∈ A˜(α, s)
} ∣
∣s
)
= 1, μ-a.e.
}
.
Finally, denoting by CM the set of real, continuous, and monotone functions defined
on Λ × A, we can define
Tˆd :=
⎧
⎨
⎩
τ ∈ TˆΛ
∣
∣
∣
∣∀ f ∈ CM, s →
∫
Λ×A
f (α, a)τ (dα × da|s) ∈ M(S)
⎫
⎬
⎭
,
where M(S) denotes the space of S-measurable functions mapping S to R. Hence,
Tˆd is a set of equivalence classes of functions mapping S to D with values (i.e.,
probability distributions) concentrated on the graph19 of A˜(·, s) for μ-a.e. s ∈ S.
In addition, we require that for any continuous, monotone function f , function
g(·) := ∫
Λ×A f (α, a)τ (dα × da|·) is S-measurable.
3.2 Decision problems and equilibrium definition
We are now ready to characterize the decision problem faced by each agent in the
game. If each player assumes the information structure Sα is generated by a countable
partition such that for all U ∈ Sα, μ(U ) > 0, then the sequence of the game can be
defined as follows. First, each player observes the state of the world s ∈ S with respect
to her private information Sα . Next, players calculate their interim payoffs, which are
defined by the mapping v : Λ × S × Tˆ × A → R, where
v(α, s, τ, a) :=
∫
εα(s)
r(α, s′, τ (·|s′), a)πα(s′|εα(s))μ(ds′),
with
πα(s
′|εα(s)) :=
{
πα(s
′)∫
εα(s)
πα(s′′)μ(ds′′) if s
′ ∈ εα(s),
0 if s′ /∈ εα(s);
where εα(s) is the smallest (under set inclusion) set in Sα that contains s. Our later
assumptions guarantee that v is well defined. Once the players’ strategies are chosen,
payoffs are distributed. We summarize this game by the following tuple:
19 Let Ψ : X ⇒ Y be a correspondence. By Gr(Ψ ) ⊂ X × Y , we denote the graph of Ψ .
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Γ := {(Λ,L, λ), (S,S, μ), A, A˜, r, {πα,Sα}α∈Λ},
and define the notion of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this game as
follows.
Definition 1 A distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ is an equivalence class
τ ∗ ∈ Tˆd such that μ-a.e.
τ ∗
({
(α, a) ∈ Λ × A ∣∣v(α, s, τ ∗, a) ≥ v(α, s, τ ∗, a′),∀a′ ∈ A˜(α, s)
} ∣
∣s
)
= 1.
Notice that our definition of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium generalizes
the concept of distributional equilibrium proposed in Mas-Colell (1984) to the case of
large differential information game. In particular, we consider a distributional Bayesian
Nash equilibrium to be an equivalence class of functions τ ∈ Tˆd , as opposed to a single
function. Therefore, given a function, the above definition need only hold μ-a.e. s ∈ S.
Eventually, we shall define equilibrium in the rather specific class of functions Tˆd
(rather than the class TˆΛ). Clearly, there might exist functions in TˆΛ\Tˆd satisfying our
definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. However, as our existence result holds in Tˆd ,
we restrict our definition solely to this space.
3.3 Sufficient conditions
To prove the existence of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we impose the
following assumptions on the primitives of the game.
Assumption 1 Whenever τ ∈ Tˆd , let
(i) A˜ be complete sublattice-valued, with A˜(·, s) having a compact graph for all
s ∈ S. Furthermore, let A˜ be weakly measurable, and the graph correspondence
G˜r(s) := {(α, a) : a ∈ A˜(α, s)} be weakly measurable;20 Finally, assume that for
μ a.e. s, G˜r(s) is an increasing set, i.e., the indicator of this set is an increasing
function;
(ii) r be continuous and quasi-supermodular on A, have single-crossing differences
in (a, τ ), and r(α, s, τ (·|s), a) be L ⊗ S-measurable;
(iii) forλ-a.e. player, and any τ ∈ Tˆd , the family of functions {r(α, s, τ (·|s), ·)}s∈S sat-
isfy signed-ratio quasi-supermodularity on A, while functions {Δ(·, s)}s∈S , with
Δ(τ, s) := r(α, s, τ (·|s), a′)−r(α, s, τ (·|s), a), obey signed-ratio monotonicity
in the pointwise order, for any a′, a ∈ A, a′ ≥ a;
(iv) for all α ∈ Λ, Sα be generated by a countable partition such that for all s ∈
S, πα(s) is L⊗S measurable, the correspondence (α, s) → εα(s) has L⊗S⊗S
measurable graph and μ(εα(s)) > 0.
We make a few remarks on this assumption. First, although Assumptions 1(i),(ii),(iv)
are rather standard, Assumption 1(iii) deserves some comment. In this assumption,
20 Then, from Kuratowski–Ryll–Nardzewski Selection Theorem, there exists a measurable selection from
graph of G˜r(·) (see Theorem 18.31 in Aliprantis and Border 2006).
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we first require sufficient structure such that the quasi-supermodularity of payoff r ,
as well as single-crossing differences, is preserved under aggregation with respect to
the space of public signals. This is necessary for our arguments, as ordinal properties
(in this case ordinal complementarities) are generally not preserved under aggrega-
tion.21 The conditions we impose in Assumption 1(iii) were first proposed in Quah
and Strulovici (2012), where the authors referred to it as signed-ratio monotonicity.
Second of all, it bears mentioning that there is a delicate difference between the
related definition of signed-ratio monotonicity in Quah and Strulovici (2012), and
our functional version of the signed-ratio monotonicity that we use extensively in
this paper. In particular, when analyzing large games with differential information,
and formulating appropriate ordinal complementarity conditions, we are interested in
the aggregation of ordinal difference properties for values at different points in their
domain. This fact changes the nature of the signed-ratio monotonicity condition that is
required to obtain ascending best replies as compared to the related condition studied
in Quah and Strulovici (2012).
We can provide a simple example of the difference between our version of the
signed-ratio monotonicity assumption as compared to Quah and Strulovici (2012).
Consider an optimization problem faced by an agent who is uncertain about two
possible states, say elements of the set {H, L}, where state H occurs with probability
p, and state L occurs with probability (1− p). Assume further that the agent maximizes
his expected payoff taking into account strategies of other players, which depend on
the realized state. Therefore, for some function τ : {H, L} → D, the agent maximizes
r(H, τ (H), a)p + r(L , τ (L), a)(1 − p),
where a denotes the decision variable. As τ(H) might not be equivalent to τ(L), the
above function need not have single-crossing differences even if r(s, φ, a) has single-
crossing differences in (a, φ), φ ∈ D, and the family of functions {(·, s)}s∈{H,L}
(where (φ, s) := r(s, φ, a′)−r(s, φ, a)) is a family of functions obeying the signed-
ratio monotonicity as in Quah and Strulovici (2012).
Finally, the signed-ratio monotonicity needs to be satisfied for any τ within the
class of equilibrium candidates, e.g., Tˆd . In fact, we require that the family of func-
tions {(·, s)}s∈{H,L} satisfies the signed-ratio monotonicity with respect to the space
(Tˆd ,Tˆ ). Because of this situation, we must require a somewhat stronger version of
the signed-ratio monotonicity in our games so that we can guarantee the existence of
sufficient complementarities in the game that are preserved under aggregation in the
player’s optimization problems. The next result characterizes the strength of the above
assumptions.
Lemma 1 The collection of single-crossing functions {v(s, ·)}s∈S, where v(s, f ) :=
u(s, f (s)) obeys signed-ratio monotonicity if and only if one of the condition holds:
21 Notice that if we impose on r more standard cardinal forms of complementarities (i.e., assume r is
supermodular in a and has increasing differences in (a, φ), φ ∈ D), then Assumption 1(iii) immediately
holds.
123
212 Ł. Balbus et al.
(i) u has a fixed sign, i.e., u(s, x) ≥ 0 for all (s, x) ∈ S × X, or u(s, x) ≤ 0 for all
(s, x) ∈ S × X,
(ii) u(s, ·) is increasing for all s ∈ S.
Proof We prove the result by contradiction. Suppose that neither (i) nor (ii) holds.
Then, there exist some s0 and x1 < x2 such that u(s0, x1) > u(s0, x2). Since u(s0, ·)
is a single-crossing function, there are two possible cases: (a) u(s0, x1) > 0, and
u(s0, x2) > 0; or (b) u(s0, x1) < 0, and u(s0, x2) < 0.
In (a) is true, there is some s1 ∈ S and y ∈ X such that u(s1, y) < 0. Define
f : S → X and g : S → X such that f ≤ g, f (s0) = x1, g(s0) = x2, and
f (s1) = g(s1) = y. Then,
−u(s1, f (s1))
u(s0, f (s0)) = −
u(s1, y)
u(s0, x1)
< − u(s1, y)
u(s0, x2)
= −u(s1, g(s1))
u(s0, g(s0))
,
which contradicts signed-ratio monotonicity. If (b) is true, we define s1 and y such that
u(s1, y) > 0. Let function f and g be such that f ≤ g and f (s0) = x1, g(s0) = x2
and f (s1) = g(s1) = y. Then, we have
−u(s0, f (s0))
u(s1, f (s1)) = −
u(s0, x1)
u(s1, y)
< −u(s0, x2)
u(s1, y)
= −u(s0, g(s0))
u(s1, g(s1))
.
This contradicts the signed-ratio property of v. unionsq
The above lemma implies that if the payoff functions satisfies Assumption 1(iii)
for any τ ∈ Tˆd payoff r needs to be monotone in (s, τ ) or has increasing differences
in (a, τ ).
3.4 Existence of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibria
We are now ready to present a series of lemmata, as well as one key proposition,
that will allow us to prove the main equilibrium existence result of this section of the
paper. We should mention that the main tool used in the proofs of this section per
the question of existence of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibria is Markowsky’s
fixed point theorem (see Theorem 4 in the “Appendix”). In our context, we will show
that the theorem implies the existence of a fixed point of a Tˆ -increasing operator
mapping poset Tˆd to itself.
Along these lines, we begin by showing that the poset (Tˆd ,Tˆ ) is chain complete,
a property required to apply Markowsky’s (1976) theorem.
Proposition 1 (Tˆd ,Tˆ ) is a chain complete poset.
Proof Take any chain T0 ⊂ Tˆd . First, we show that ∨ T0 ∈ Tˆd . The case ∧ T0 ∈ Tˆd
follows analogously. As usual by [ f ], we denote an equivalence class of functions
equal f for μ a.e. s ∈ S. We induce ≤μ between these class as follows [ f ] ≤μ [g] if
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f ≤ g for μ a.e. s ∈ S. Let f ∈ CM. By Birkhoff (1967, Theorem 3, p. 241), there
exists the least (modulo null) measurable function ϕ( f ) : S → R such that:22
[ϕ0( f )(·)] =
∨
τ∈T0
[ ∫
Λ×A
f (α, a)τ (dα × da|·)
]
.
Without loss of generality suppose ϕ0( f )(s) = f if f is a constant function.
We show that L : C(Λ × A) → M(S) defined as L( f ) = [ϕ0( f )] is an operator
preserving linear combination of CM with nonnegative coefficients. Take any τ ∈ T0
and τ ′ ∈ T0 such that τ ′ Tˆ τ . Let x := (α, a) and X = Λ × A. Then, for arbitrary
β1 ≥ 0, β2 ≥ 0, f ∈ CM and g ∈ CM, we have
[ϕ0(β1 f + β2g)(·)] ≥μ β1
⎡
⎣
∫
X
f (x)τ (dx |·)
⎤
⎦ + β2
⎡
⎣
∫
X
g(x)τ ′(dx |·)
⎤
⎦ .
Taking a supremum over τ ′ ∈ T0 and next over τ ∈ T , we have
[ϕ0(β1 f + β2g)(·)] ≥μ β1 [ϕ0( f )(·)] + β2 [ϕ0(g)(·)] . (1)
We now show the reverse inequality. Take an arbitrary τ ∈ T0, we have
⎡
⎣
∫
X
(β1 f (x) + β2g(x)) τ (dx |·)
⎤
⎦ ≤μ β1 [ϕ0( f )(·)] + β2 [ϕ0(g)(·)] .
Taking a supremum over τ ∈ T0, we have
[ϕ0(β1 f + β2g)(·)] ≤μ β1 [ϕ0( f )(·)] + β2 [ϕ0(g)(·)] . (2)
By definition of L , Combining (1) and (2), we have
L(β1 f + β2g) = β1L( f ) + β2L(g). (3)
Observe that C(X) is Polish space since X is compact and metrizable. Define
LM := CM − CM. That is LM := { f − g, f ∈ CM, g ∈ CM}. Clearly, it is Riesz
sublattice of C(X) containing the unit constant and separates the points of X . Hence,
by the Stone–Weierstrass Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 9.12),
LM is uniformly dense in C(X). As a result, there exists uniformly dense countable
22 Observe that the supremum with this order may essentially differ from the supremum with respect
to the pointwise order. Let Ω be a set of ordinal numbers with the continuum cardinality. Consider
a one-to-one function from ξ : Ω → [0, 1]. Let Eω := {ξ(ω′)|ω′ < ω}. Define ω := min{ω ∈
Ω|Eω is non-measurable}. In other words ϕ( f )(s) = ∨{
∫
Λ×A f (α, a)τω(dα×da|s)|ω ∈ Ω}. For ω < ω
consider fω(x) = χEω (x). Clearly, fω is a chain with a pointwise limit as indicator of a non-measurable
set.
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subset of LM which is dense in C(X). Let F0 ⊂ CM be a countable subset such that
F0 − F0 is uniformly dense in C(X). Assume F0 contains the unit constant. For all
φ ∈ F0, ψ ∈ F0, β1 ∈ Q+, β2 ∈ Q+ define
Oφ,ψ,β1,β2 := {s ∈ S : ϕ0(β1φ + β2ψ)(s) = β1ϕ0(φ)(s) + β2ϕ0(ψ)(s)}.
By definition of L and (3), we have μ(Oφ,ψ,β1,β2) = 1 for all (φ,ψ, β1, β2) ∈
F20 × Q2+, hence for
S0 :=
⋂
(φ,ψ,β1,β2)∈F20 ×Q2+
Oφ,ψ,β1,β2
we have μ(S0) = 1. We also define
Pφ,ψ := {s : ϕ0(φ)(s) ≤ ϕ0(ψ)(s)}
if φ ≤ ψ where ≤ is standard product pointwise order. Clearly, μ(Pφ,ψ) = 1, hence
μ(S1) = 1 where
S1 := S0 ∩
⋂
φ≤ψ
Pφ,ψ .
For fixed s ∈ S1, we construct a linear functional Ls on C(X) which agrees with
ϕ0(·)(s) on F0. In other words, define
Ls(φ) :=ϕ0(φ)(s). (4)
Next, we construct Ls for f ∈ CM. Let {φn}n∈N ⊂ F0 and {ψn}n∈N ⊂ F0 be sequences
such that φn ⇒ f and ψn ⇒ f . Let  > 0 be arbitrary small rational number. Then,
for sufficiently large n > 0, we have
− + φn(x) ≤ ψn(x) ≤ φn(x) + ,
for arbitrary x ∈ X . By definition of S1 and ϕ0, we have
− + ϕ0(φn)(s) ≤ ϕ0(ψn)(s) ≤ ϕ0(φn)(s) + ,
As a result,
|ϕ0(φn)(s) − ϕ0(ψn)(s)| → 0 as n → ∞, (5)
for arbitrary s ∈ S1. We show that {ϕ0(φn)(s)}n∈N is a convergent subsequence. Since
φn is uniformly convergent, for arbitrary rational and positive  and sufficiently large
(n, m) ∈ Nn , we have
− + φn(x) ≤ φm(x) ≤ φn(x) + ,
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for all x ∈ X . Again by definition of S1 and ϕ0, we have
− + ϕ0(φn)(s) ≤ ϕ0(ψm)(s) ≤ ϕ0(φn)(s) + . (6)
Combining (5) and (6), we have {ϕ0(φn)(s)}n∈N and {ϕ0(ψn)(s)}n∈N are both
Cauchy sequences convergent to the same limit. Hence, we can define as follows:
Ls( f ) := lim
n→∞ ϕ0(φn)(s) where {φn}n∈N is arbitrary sequence such that φn ⇒ f . For
f ∈ LM, we can define Ls( f ) in a canonical way.
Now, we show that Ls is continuous linear functional with unit norm on LM. Let
f = f1 − f2 and fi ∈ CM, i = 1, 2 || f ||∞ ≤ 1. Observe that Ls is increasing on the
whole CM, and Ls(1)(s) = 1. As a result,
−1 + Ls( f2) ≤ Ls( f1) ≤ 1 + Ls( f2).
Hence, |Ls( f )| ≤ 1, and Ls is continuous linear functional on LM with unit norm.
Consequently, noting that LM is Riesz Lattice by Hahn–Banach Extension Theorem
(see Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 8.31) we can extend Ls to the whole C(X).
Moreover, this functional is positive with the unit norm. Then, by Riesz Markov
Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 14.12), there exists a positive
probability measure τ 0(·|s) such that
Ls( f ) =
∫
Λ×A
f (·)τ 0(·|s) (7)
for any f ∈ C(Λ × A). Clearly, τ 0 ∈ Tˆd . To finish this proof, we need to show τ 0 is
the least upper bound of T0.
First, we show that τ 0 is upper bound of T0. Take any τ ∈ T0.
Then, there exist S2 ⊂ S1 such that μ(S2) = 1 and for all φ ∈ F0
∫
X
φ(x)τ 0(dx |s) = ϕ0(φ)(s) ≥
∫
X
φ(x)τ (dx |s), (8)
for s ∈ S2, where equality follows from (4) and (7). If we take f ∈ CM, we just need
to take a subsequence {φn} ⊂ F0 φn ⇒ f , put it in (8) and take a limit. Hence, (8)
holds for all f ∈ CM and for s ∈ S2, with μ(S2) = 1. Therefore, τ 0 d ∨ T0.
We show that
∨
T0 d τ 0. Let τ ′ be arbitrary upper bound of T0, and τ ∈ T0 be
given. Then, for all f ∈ CM,
⎡
⎣
∫
X
f (x)τ (dx |·)
⎤
⎦ ≤μ
⎡
⎣
∫
X
f (x)τ ′(dx |·)
⎤
⎦ .
As a result, by definition of ϕ0,
[ϕ0( f )(·)] ≤μ
⎡
⎣
∫
X
f (x)τ ′(dx |·)
⎤
⎦ . (9)
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Combining (7) and (9) for φ ∈ F0, we have
⎡
⎣
∫
X
φ(x)τ 0(dx |·)
⎤
⎦ ≤μ
⎡
⎣
∫
X
φ(x)τ ′(dx |·)w
⎤
⎦ .
Then, there exists a full measure set S3 such that for s ∈ S3 we have
∫
X
φ(x)τ 0(dx |s) ≤
∫
X
φ(x)τ ′(dx |s).
To finish this proof, we just need to note that F0 is dense in CM. As a result∨ T0 d τ 0.
Similarly, we can show
∧
T0 ∈ T0.
Finally, by Assumption 1 (i), both ∨ T0 and
∧
T0 are concentrated on the graph of
G˜r . unionsq
Notice that this proposition greatly generalizes the well-known result stating that
the set of probability measures on Λ× A is a chain complete poset (see Hopenhayn and
Prescott 1992, Proposition 1) to the differential information setting. It is also techni-
cally very different from the result used in Balbus et al. (2013) where the authors study
the case of a large game with strategic complementarities under complete information.
We now define the operator that shall play a central role in our proof of existence.
That is, define the best reply correspondence of a player to be
m(α, s, τ ) := arg max
a∈ A˜(α,s)
v(α, s, τ, a),
and let
m(α, s, τ ) :=
∨
m(α, s, τ ) and m(α, s, τ ) :=
∧
m(α, s, τ )
be the extremal elements of m(a, s, τ ) with respect to the partial order ≥ on A (i.e.,
the greatest and the least best reply, respectively), whenever these elements exist. By
the definition of equilibrium, for μ- a.e. s, distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium
τ ∗ satisfies
τ ∗
({(α, a) ∈ Λ × A|a ∈ m(α, s, τ ∗)}|s) = 1.
Consider an operator B that transforms the space Tˆd into itself, such that given
some function τ ∈ Tˆd , it returns function B(τ ), where probability measure B(τ )(s)
is concentrated on the set of greatest best responses to τ . That is, more precisely, we
define the operator B : Tˆd → Tˆd by:
B(τ ) =
{
τ ′ ∈ Tˆd
∣
∣τ ′(Gr(m(·, s, τ ))|s) = 1, μ-a.e.
}
.
We define the least distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium selection B(τ ) in an
analogous way.
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In order to make sure that the above operator possesses all the desired properties,
we must show that if r has single-crossing differences in (a, φ), a ∈ A, φ ∈ D,
and the family of functions {Δ(·, s)}s∈S obeys the signed-ratio monotonicity (where
Δ : Tˆd × S → R, Δ(τ, s) := r(α, s, τ (·|s), a′)−r(α, s, τ (·|s), a)), then v has single-
crossing differences in the μ-a.e. pointwise order Tˆ on Tˆd .
Lemma 2 Let (X,≥X ), (S,≥S) be posets, (S,S, μ) be a non-empty, non-atomic,
σ -finite measure space, and M(S) be a set of S-measurable functions f : S → X.
Let u : S × X → R be a function such that u(s, f (s)) is S-integrable, whenever
f ∈ M(S). Assume u is a single-crossing function in x for all s ∈ S. Finally, let
{v(s, ·)}s∈S, where v : S × M(S) → R, v(s, f ) := u(s, f (s)), obey the signed-ratio
monotonicity with respect to the pointwise ordering on M(S). Then, h : M(S) → R,
h( f ) :=
∫
T
u(s, f (s))μ(ds)
is a single-crossing function with respect to μ-a.e. pointwise order.
Proof Note that ∀s ∈ S, u(s, ·) is a single-crossing function, and family {v(s, ·)}s∈S
is well defined on M(S) and obeys the signed-ratio monotonicity with respect to the
pointwise order on M(S). Corollary 9 implies that h is a single-crossing function with
respect to the same ordering.
We will show that h is also a single-crossing function on M(S) with respect to μ-a.e.
pointwise order. Take any f ′, f ∈ M(S) such that f ′(s) ≥X f (s), for μ-a.e. s ∈ S,
and let S′ denote the set of points t where either f ′(s) < f (s) or f ′(s), f (s) are
unordered. Clearly, μ(S′) = 0. Assume 0 ≤ (<)h( f ). Then,
0 ≤ (<)h( f ) =
∫
S
u(s, f (s))μ(ds) =
∫
S\S′
u(s, f (s))μ(ds).
Since {v(s, ·)}s∈S is a family obeying the signed-ratio monotonicity on M(S) with
respect to the pointwise order, so is {v(s, ·)}s∈S\S′ . Hence,
0 ≤ (<)
∫
S\S′
u(s, f ′(s))μ(ds) =
∫
S
u(s, f ′(s))μ(ds) = h( f ′).
The proof is complete.
By Lemma 2, we know that integration preserves the single-crossing property in
the μ-a.e. pointwise order. Therefore, this fact explains why we do not work with
standard pointwise partial orders in our existence constructions.23
We now characterize the monotonicity properties of the pair of operators defined
before.
23 Similar concerns, but in a quite different context, arise in the work of Van Zandt (2010).
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Lemma 3 Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. Then, operators B and B are well defined
and Tˆ -isotone.
Proof We prove the result for B. The proof for B is analogous. First, v(α, s, τ, ·) is
continuous on A. Moreover, by Lemma 9 in Ely and Pe˛ski (2006), it is also L × S-
measurable; hence, v is Carathéodory. By Assumption 1 (ii),(iii), as well as Corollar-
ies 6, 9 and Lemma 2, v is quasi-supermodular in a and has single-crossing differences
in (a, τ ) with respect to Tˆ .
Since A˜(α, s) is compact, by Berge’s Maximum Theorem (see Berge 1997, p. 116),
the set m(α, s, τ ) := arg maxa∈ A˜(α,s) v(α, s, τ, a) is non-empty. In addition, by Mil-
grom and Shannon’s (1994) or Veinott’s (1992) generalization of Topkis’s Monotonic-
ity Theorem (see Topkis 1978), m(α, s, τ ) is a complete sublattice of A˜(α, s) with the
greatest and the least element. Moreover, it is isotone in the Veinott’s strong set order
in τ . From the Measurable Maximum Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border 2006, The-
orem 18.19), it follows that m is L ⊗ S-measurable (hence, weakly measurable, as A
is a metrizable space which admits a measurable selection; see Aliprantis and Border
2006, Lemma 18.2). Therefore, m(α, s, τ ) exists and is increasing on Tˆd .
We now need to prove that m(α, s, τ ) is a measurable selection of m(α, s, τ ). Define
m(α, s, τ ) = (m1, . . . , mn). Again by the Measurable Maximum Theorem, function
mi (·, τ ) := maxai∈m(·,τ ) ai is L ⊗ S-measurable for any τ and i = 1, . . . , n. Hence,
m(·, τ ) is also L ⊗ S-measurable, and B(τ ) is S-measurable.
Next, we show that B is increasing. Fix an arbitrary, ≥p-increasing function f :
Λ × A → R. For an arbitrary, α ∈ Λ. We prove that τ → m(α, s, τ ) is isotone,
whenever τ ∈ Tˆd . Let τ Tˆ τ ′. Fix an arbitrary an s ∈ S such that τ ′(s) D τ(s).
We have:
∫
Λ×A
f (α, a)B(τ ′)(dα × da|s) =
∫
Λ×A
f (α, m(α, s, τ ′))λ(dα)
≥
∫
Λ×A
f (α, m(α, s, τ ))λ(dα)
=
∫
Λ×A
f (α, a)B(τ )(dα × da|s),
where the first and the final equalities follow from the definition of B, and the inequality
is implied by the monotonicity of m in τ . Since the set of s ∈ S satisfying the above
equation has full measure, B(τ ) Tˆ B(τ ′).
Having these two lemmas in place, we are able to state our main result of this
section.
Theorem 1 (Existence) Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. Then, there exists the greatest
and the least distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ in (Tˆd ,Tˆ ).
Proof By Lemma 3, B is isotone. Moreover, by Proposition 1, Tˆd is a chain complete
poset. Hence, by Markowsky’s theorem (see “Appendix”, Theorem 4), B has a chain
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complete poset of fixed points in an induced order, with the greatest and the least
element. Denote the greatest element of the set by τ ∗. Then, by definition, τ ∗ constitutes
a distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ .
Next, we prove that τ ∗ is the greatest equilibrium of the game. Take any other
equilibrium of the game τ . Fix s ∈ S, such that
τ ({(α, a)|a ∈ m(α, s, τ )} |s) = 1.
Let f : Λ × A → R be ≥p-increasing. Then,
∫
Λ×A
f (α, a)τ (dα × da|s) ≤
∫
Λ×A
f (α, m(α, s, τ ))λ(dα)
≤
∫
Λ×A
f (α, a)B(τ )(dα × da|s).
Therefore, B(τ ) Tˆ τ . Since B is isotone, by Markowsky’s theorem, we have
B(τ ∗) Tˆ τ . We prove the existence of the least equilibrium analogously, using
operator B.
Few remarks concerning the result. First of all, the above theorem not only shows
the existence of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium, but also assures existence
of extremal equilibria. That is, it implies that there exists the greatest and the least
element. We should also remark that by Markowsky’s theorem, both B and B have a
chain complete poset of fixed points, each one of them constituting a Bayesian Nash
distributional equilibrium of the game.24
Second of all, the sufficient conditions for existence that we impose in our approach
differ from those used in Balder and Rustichini (1994) or Kim and Yannelis (1997).25
In particular, our class of games relaxes an important payoff continuity assumption.26
Finally, and most importantly, Assumptions 1(ii)–(iii) can be relaxed if one is inter-
ested in the existence of greatest (respectively, the least) distributional equilibrium
of the game, but not both. Specifically, one can replace the condition (a) of quasi-
supermodularity (equivalent to lattice superextremal in Li Calzi and Veinott 1992
and Veinott 1992 for real-valued functions) of payoff r in actions a ∈ A with join-
(respectively, meet-) super extremal, and condition (b) concerning single-crossing
differences with join (respectively, meet) up-crossing differences in (a, τ ), and condi-
tion (c) concerning the signed-ratio monotonicity, with their join- (respectively, meet-)
counterparts. This weakening of our conditions allows us to generalize our results to
an even broader class of large games (see Li Calzi and Veinott 1992 and Veinott 1992
for the details). This observation becomes particularly useful when one is unable to
24 However, our application of Markowsky’s fixed point theorem here does not imply that the equilibrium
set is a chain complete poset.
25 However, we do not generalize the result, since we restrain our attention solely to GSC.
26 See also Yannelis (2009) for a discussion of payoff continuity conditions required for the existence of
equilibrium using the topological approach.
123
220 Ł. Balbus et al.
show that the game in question is quasi-supermodular. In fact, we provide one such an
example in Sect. 5.3, where we discuss the application of our results to common value
auctions where the complementarity structure between (a, τ ) has join up-crossing
differences (but not meet up-crossing differences).
3.5 Monotone equilibrium comparative statics
We conclude this section of the paper by considering computational issues related to
equilibrium existence, as well as the monotone comparative statics of the equilibrium
set. We prove two results. The first one pertains to computing extremal equilibria at
fixed parameters. The second one establishes the existence of computable equilibrium
comparative statics as a function of deep parameters of the game. Such a question has
not been considered in any of the existing literature of which we are aware. For such
computability results, we need to impose one additional condition concerning order
continuity of payoffs, which proves to be critical in our main result, as it preserves
order continuity of the extremal selections in the best reply maps.
Assumption 2 For any monotone sequence {φn} in D, such that φn → φ and φ ∈ D,
let r(α, s, φn, a) → r(α, s, φ, a).
If r satisfies Assumption 1 in addition to Assumption 2, then r(α, s, τ, a) is jointly
σ -order continuous in (a, τ ) for each (α, s).
Given the additional assumption, we proceed with the following corollary to our
main existence result. We should mention that this result is of utmost importance for
designing numerical methods aimed to compute equilibrium distributions and proving
a rigorous foundation for their use. First by Bn(t), define the n-th orbit of operator B
starting from t , i.e., B0(t) = t and Bn+1(t) = B(Bn(t)) . Similarly define Bn(t).
Corollary 1 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be satisfied and t, t denote the greatest and the
least element of Tˆd , respectively. Then, the greatest and least distributional Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of Γ satisfies the following successive approximation condition:
∀s ∈ S we have τ ∗(s) = limn→∞ Bn(t)(s), τ ∗(s) = limn→∞ Bn(t)(s), where limits
are taken with respect to the weak-star topology.
Proof Lemma 3 implies that both B, B : Tˆd → Tˆd are well defined. We claim that B is
inf-preserving, while B is sup-preserving. Fix s ∈ S and take any decreasing sequence
{τn(s)}, τn(s) → τ(s), τ ∈ Tˆd . Observe that τ(s) = ∧ τn(s). Since B is increasing,∧
B(τn)(s) = limn→∞ B(τn)(s). On the other hand, B(∧ τn)(s) = B(τ )(s). It is
therefore sufficient to show that limn→∞ B(τn)(s) = B(τ )(s). By Assumption 2 and
Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem,
lim
n→∞
∨
{
arg max
a∈ A˜(α,s)
v(α, s, τn, a)
}
=
∨
{
arg max
a∈ A˜(α,s)
v(α, s, τ, a)
}
,
for all (α, s) ∈ Λ × S. Hence, limn→∞ B(τn)(s) = limn→∞ ∨ B(τn)(s) =∨
B(τ )(s) = B(τ )(s), and so B(∧ τ n)(s) = ∧ B(τ n)(s). Analogously, we can
prove that B is sup-preserving.
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The rest follows from Theorem 1 and the generalization of the Knaster–Tarski
theorem (see Theorem 5 in the “Appendix”). unionsq
Finally, we can consider the question of computing equilibrium comparative statics.
To study this question, we introduced a parameterized version of our game. So let
(Θ,≥θ ) and define a tuple:
Γ (θ) := {(Λ,L, λ), (S,S, μ), A, A˜(θ, ·), r(θ, ·){πα,Sα}α∈Λ}.
That is, for each θ , the game Γ (θ) is defined as in the first part of this section. We
proceed with the following natural extensions of our original assumptions.
Assumption 3 For each θ ∈ Θ, Γ (θ) satisfies Assumption 1. Moreover,
(i) A˜(θ, ·) is increasing in the Veinott strong set order on Θ;
(ii) r has single-crossing differences in (a, θ);
(iii) the family of functions {Δ(·, s)}s∈S , where Δ(θ, s) := r(θ, α, s, τ (·|s), a′) −
r(θ, α, s, τ (·|s), a), obeys signed-ratio monotonicity for any a′, a ∈ A, a ≤ a′.
With this assumption in place, our next result follows from Corollary 10. That
is, for any θ ∈ Θ , let τ ∗(θ) (respectively, τ ∗(θ)) be the greatest (respectively, the
least) distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Γ (θ). Then, we have the following
monotone equilibrium comparative statics result.
Corollary 2 Let Assumptions 1–3 be satisfied. Then, τ ∗(·) and τ ∗(·) are increasing
on Θ .
Proof By Assumptions 1–3, for any τ ∈ Tˆd , B(τ ) (respectively, B(τ )) is increasing
in θ and inf-preserving (respectively, sup-preserving) on Tˆd . Therefore, by Corollary
10, τ ∗(·) and τ ∗(·) are increasing on Θ .
Note that apart from the related paper of Balbus et al. (2013) concerning large
GSC with complete information, we are not aware of any similar comparative statics
results with the one notable exception being Acemoglu and Jensen (2010). In this
latter paper, the authors consider aggregative games with a finite number of player
types, but otherwise develop similar tools to those we consider in this paper. Their
approach to equilibrium comparative statics, though, is very similar to ours, as they
impose conditions guaranteeing that the joint best response mapping has increasing
selections with respect to parameter s (c.f., Definition 3 in their paper). Further, as they
concentrate only on aggregative games where players best respond to the average/mean
action of other players, the class of games they analyze is more restrictive than ours.
On the other hand, in the case of a single-dimensional action space A, Acemoglu
and Jensen manage to show comparative statics of the extremal (aggregative) equilib-
ria using results of Milgrom and Roberts (1994) without the single-crossing property
between player actions and aggregates. This is a very important result, and more
general than ours (in the case, we restrict our attention to only large aggregative
games). However, for multi-dimensional case of large aggregative games, Acemoglu
and Jensen require increasing differences in the action of each player and the equilib-
rium aggregate, which is stronger than the (ordinal) single-crossing property we invoke
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to obtain our result. Finally, Acemoglu and Jensen 2010 use a topological fixed point
theorem to show existence of an aggregate equilibrium, which makes the issues of
computability of equilibrium comparative statics difficult to address. On the contrary,
we use exclusively order-theoretic fixed point results, where sufficient conditions to
address these issues are very direct.
4 Bayesian Nash–Schmeidler equilibria
In the next section of the paper, we present corresponding results for Bayesian Nash–
Schmeidler equilibrium, which requires an alternative description of our large game
with differential information. This notion of equilibria is defined in terms of functions
mapping the space of players to actions as in Schmeidler (1973). We begin with a
slightly modified description of the game.
4.1 Game description
LetΛ again be a compact, metrizable space of players, and endowΛwith a non-atomic,
probability measure λ defined on the Borel σ -field L. Denote the measure space of
public signals by (S,S, μ), defined as in the previous section. By Sα, α ∈ Λ, we
denote a sub σ -field of S (denoting the private information of agent α ∈ Λ), and by
πα : S → R+ the distribution of agent α ∈ Λ, where πα is such that
∫
S πα(s)dμ(s) =
1. Further, let A ⊂ Rn be a set of actions of players, endowed with the Euclidean
topology generating Borel σ -field A on A. We endow A with the coordinate-wise
order ≥. Finally, as we introduce a notion of equilibrium that involves joint actions of
players (as opposed to distributions), we analyze the set of functions of joint actions of
players f : Λ× S → A which are measurable with respect to product σ -field L⊗S.
Denote the space of such functions by M(Λ × S) and endow it with the product
topology and the pointwise order.
We now reconsider the components of the game and define an appropriate alternative
notion of equilibrium for the Bayes–Schmeidler case. As before, the correspondence
of feasible actions will be A˜ : Λ × S ⇒ A which assigns a set of feasible actions to
player α ∈ Λ, who finds herself in state s ∈ S. The ex-post payoffs are given by a
function r : Λ × S × M(Λ × S) × A → R, where r(α, s, f (·, s), a) is the payoff
value of player α ∈ Λ, playing action a ∈ A at state s ∈ S, when the joint action of
all other players at the state is f ∈ M(Λ × S).
We can now describe the sequence of play in the game as follows. First, each player
observes the state of the world s ∈ S with respect to her private information set Sα .
Next, the players calculate their interim payoffs. If we let εα(s) to be the smallest
set in Sα containing s (by set inclusion), then the interim payoff of player α ∈ Λ
in state s ∈ S facing a joint action f ∈ M(Λ × S) is defined by value function
v : Λ × S × M(Λ × S) × A → R:
v(α, s, f, a) :=
∫
εα(s)
r(α, s′, f (·, s′), a)πα(s′|εα(s))dμ(s′),
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where πα(s′|εα(s)) is defined as in Sect. 3.1. Our later assumptions guarantee that v
is well defined. Finally, once the strategies are chosen, the actual state is revealed, and
payoffs of the game are distributed.
According to the above definition of the game, a feasible pure strategy of player
α is an S-measurable selection of A˜(α, ·). Let M(S) denote the set of S-measurable
functions f : S → R and denote the set of all feasible strategies of player α by Mα ,
i.e.,
Mα := { f ∈ M(S)| f (s) ∈ A˜(α, s)}.
Therefore, a joint pure strategy of all players is an element of
MΛ := { f ∈ M(Λ × S)| f (α, ·) ∈ Mα,∀α ∈ Λ}.
As in Sect. 3.1, we summarize the game by
Γ := {(Λ,L, λ), (S,S, μ), A, A˜, r, {πα,Sα}α∈Λ}.
In the line of Schmeidler (1973), we define Bayesian Nash–Schmeidler equilibrium
as follows.
Definition 2 A Bayesian Nash–Schmeidler equilibrium of Γ is a function f ∗ ∈
M(Λ × S) such that for all α ∈ Λ and s ∈ S we have
f ∗(α, s) ∈ arg max
a∈ A˜(α,s)
v(α, s, f ∗, a).
Our definition of Bayesian Nash–Schmeidler equilibrium in strategies is slightly
different from the one stated originally in Schmeidler (1973). In his definition, Schmei-
dler requires that almost every player plays a best response strategy to the equilibrium
strategy profile. In contrast, we require every player to be acting optimally in our
notion of equilibrium, as it is done for example in the papers of Balder and Rustichini
(1994) and Kim and Yannelis (1997).
4.2 Equilibrium existence
In order to guarantee the existence of a Bayesian Nash–Schmeidler equilibrium, we
impose the sufficient conditions on the primitives of the model.
Assumption 4 Assume that whenever f ∈ M(Λ × A), we have:
(i) A˜ is complete sublattice-valued and weakly measurable;
(ii) function r is continuous and quasi-supermodular on A, has single-crossing dif-
ferences in (a, f ), and r(α, s, f (·, s), a) is L ⊗ S-measurable and bounded;
(iii) the family of functions {r(α, s, f (·, s), ·)}s∈S satisfy signed-ratio quasi-supermo-
dularity on A, and the differences {Δ(·, s)}s∈S , Δ( f, s) := r(α, s, f (·, s), a′) −
r(α, s, f (·, s), a) obey signed-ratio monotonicity in the pointwise order;
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(iv) for any monotone sequence { fn} in M(Λ × S), such that fn → f and f ∈
M(Λ × S), for all α ∈ Λ, s ∈ S, and a ∈ A, we have r(α, s, fn(·, s), a) →
r(α, s, f (·, s), a);
(v) for all α ∈ Λ, Sα is generated by a countable partition such that for all s ∈ S,
πα(s) is L × S measurable, the correspondence (α, s) → εα(s) has L ⊗ S ⊗ S
measurable graph and μ(εα(s)) > 0.
Unlike in the previous section, Assumption 4(iv) not only plays a critical role
relative to the question of computation and approximation of equilibria, but also in
the existence of equilibria itself. We will remark in more details on this issue in the
remainder of this section.
Before proceeding to the main theorem, we state two important lemmas.
Lemma 4 Under Assumption 4, Mα and MΛ are non-empty.
Proof Since A ⊂ Rn , any compact subset of A is closed. Hence, by Assumption
4(i), A˜ has non-empty, closed values. Moreover, it maps the measurable space into
a complete metric space (hence, a Polish space). Therefore, by Kuratowski–Ryll–
Nardzewski Selection Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 18.13),
A˜(α, ·) and A˜ include a measurable selection.
Notice that by appealing to strategic complementarities and order-theoretic con-
structions, in a GSC, we are able to relax two important assumptions used by different
authors to obtain results per the non-emptiness and/or convexity of best replies to ver-
ify existence [e.g., as compared, for example, to Balder and Rustichini (1994) andKim
and Yannelis (1997)]. For example, we do not require the feasible action correspon-
dence A˜ to be convex-valued, nor do we require any form of (quasi-) concavity of r in
a ∈ A (so that best reply correspondences are convex-valued). In particular, we do not
appeal to any Kakutani/Fan-Glicksberg type theorem to obtain existence. Also, our
payoffs no longer need to be continuous with respect to joint strategies of players. In
fact, we only require r to be order continuous on M(Λ × S), a continuity condition
checked only along monotone sequences (as opposed to weak continuity conditions
that must be checked for arbitrary nets).27
Before stating the main result, we introduce some additional notation. First, define
the best reply correspondence BR : MΛ ⇒ MΛ by:28
BR( f )(α, s) := arg max
a∈ A˜(α,s)
v(α, s, f, a),
From the definition of Bayesian Nash–Schmeidler equilibrium, for f ∗ ∈ M(Λ ×
S) to be an equilibrium, we require f ∗ ∈ BR( f ∗). As in the previous section, we
again study the fixed point of extremal selections of best reply maps. That is, let
BR( f ) := ∨ BR( f ), and BR( f ) := ∧ BR( f ) denote the greatest and the least element
of BR( f ) (whenever they exist), with respect to the pointwise order. We now state the
following result.
27 See Aliprantis and Border (2006, Chapter 8).
28 We discuss conditions under which BR is well defined in Lemma 5.
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Lemma 5 Under Assumption 4, operators BR, BR : MΛ → MΛ are well defined
and increasing.29
Proof By Assumption 4(ii), r is continuous in a. By Lebesgue Dominated Conver-
gence Theorem, so is v. By Assumption 4(ii), r ◦ f is L ⊗ S-measurable. By Lemma
9 in Ely and Pe˛ski (2006), so is v. Therefore, v is Carathéodory in (a, (α, s)). By
Assumptions 4(ii),(iii), as well as Corollaries 6, 9, v is quasi-supermodular on A, with
single-crossing differences in (a, f ).
Recall that A is a separable metric space, (S,S) is a measurable space, and
A˜ is well defined and weakly measurable, with compact values. Therefore, by the
Measurable Maximum Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 18.19),
arg maxa∈ A˜(α,s) v(α, s, f, a) is well defined with compact values, L ⊗ S-measurable,
and admits a measurable selection. Hence, BR is well defined. In addition, since it
maps a measurable space into a metrizable space, it is also weakly measurable (see
Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 18.2).
In addition, by Milgrom and Shannon’s (1994) or Veinott’s (1992) generalization
of Topkis’ Monotonicity Theorem, it is a complete lattice with the greatest and the
least element, and isotone in the Veinott strong set order in f .
Since BR( f )(α, s) is a complete lattice, isotone in f , both BR( f ), BR( f ) have
non-empty values and are increasing in f (pointwise). Now, we prove that they are
measurable selections of BR( f ). Consider BR( f ). Let BR( f ) := ( f¯1, . . . , f¯n). The
Measurable Maximum Theorem implies that function f¯i (·) := maxai∈BR( f )(·) ai is
L⊗S-measurable for any f and i = 1, . . . , n; hence, BR( f ) is also L⊗S-measurable.
Analogously, we prove that BR( f ) is L ⊗ S-measurable.
We now state the main result of this section concerning the existence of equilibria
in the sense of Definition 2. For this result, one should keep in mind that the space
of measurable functions is only a countably chain complete poset under pointwise
partial orders. Therefore, in order to prove our new existence theorem and provide the
sharpest characterization of the set of Bayes–Schmeidler equilibria, we must apply a
generalized version of Tarski–Kantorovich Theorem (see Theorem 4.2 in Dugundji
and Granas 1982 as well as Theorem 5 in the “Appendix”).
Theorem 2 (Existence) Let Assumption 4 be satisfied. Then, there exists the great-
est ( f ∗) and the least ( f ∗) Bayesian Nash–Schmeidler equilibrium. Moreover,
the extremal equilibria can be computed by a successive approximation: i.e.,
limn→∞ BR
n
(m) = f ∗ and limn→∞ BRn(m) = f ∗, where m, m are the greatest
and the least elements of MΛ, respectively.
Proof Lemma 5 implies that both BR, BR : MΛ → MΛ are well defined. We claim
that BR is inf-preserving, while BR is sup-preserving. To see this, take a decreasing
sequence { fn}, fn → f, f ∈ MΛ. Observe that f = ∧ fn . Since BR is increasing,∧
BR( fn) = limn→∞ BR( fn). On the other hand, BR(∧ fn) = BR( f ). It is therefore
29 Recall that if M(Λ × S) is endowed with the pointwise order, then for any f ′, f ∈ M(Λ × S), f ′
dominates f , that is f ′ ≥ f , if and only if ∀(α, s) ∈ Λ × S, we have f ′(α, s) ≥ f (α, s). Therefore, we
say that BR, BR are increasing if f ′ ≥ f implies BR( f ′) ≥ BR( f ).
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sufficient to show that limn→∞ BR( fn) = BR( f ). By Assumption 4(iv) and Lebesgue
Dominated Convergence Theorem,
lim
n→∞
∨
{
arg max
a∈ A˜(α,s)
v(α, s, fn, a)
}
=
∨
{
arg max
a∈ A˜(α,s)
v(α, s, f, a)
}
,
for all (α, s) ∈ Λ × S. Therefore, limn→∞ BR( fn) = limn→∞ ∨ BR( fn) =∨
BR( f ) = BR( f ), and so BR(∧ f n) = ∧ BR( f n). Analogously, we prove that
BR is sup-preserving.
As MΛ is a countably chain complete poset, by the generalization of the Knaster–
Tarski Theorem (see Theorem 5 in the “Appendix”), BR (respectively, BR) have the
greatest (respectively, the least) fixed point.
Denote the greatest fixed point of BR by f ∗ and the least point of BR by f ∗. For an
arbitrary equilibrium f0, by Knaster–Tarski Theorem, f ∗ = ∧{ f ∈ MΛ|BR( f ) ≤
f } ≤ f0 ≤ ∨{ f ∈ MΛ|BR( f ) ≤ f } = f ∗, which completes the proof.
Few comments on Theorem 2 are in order. First of all, our existence theorem differs
from the ones existing in the literature with respect to the space of equilibrium objects.
That is, we prove existence of Bayesian Nash–Schmeidler equilibria in measurable
strategies, which represent a broader class of strategies than those studied in Balder
and Rustichini (1994) and Kim and Yannelis (1997) who analyzed Bochner integrable
strategies.
Second, papers in the literature prove the existence of Bayesian Nash–Schmeider
equilibrium based on an application of the Fan–Glicksberg fixed point theorem. In
contrast, in our argument for existence, we require the equilibrium strategy space to be
a countably chain complete poset, which is a fairly weak notion of order completeness.
This allows us to obtain results in a larger space of admissible equilibrium functions.
Of course, we do not obtain these new results without cost; our approach requires
several additional assumptions that are not necessary in any of these aforementioned
papers per the question of existence. That is, none of these papers require a lattice
structure for action sets, quasi-supermodularity and single-crossing differences of
payoff functions, etc.
Third, Balder and Rustichini (1994) and Kim and Yannelis (1997) also analyze
large games without the assumption that the set of players is represented by a measure
space (hence, without the measurability assumption on the set of players). Once we use
our methods applied to their alternative notion of equilibrium in the game, our results
become even stronger. That is, in the case where the measurability requirement for
equilibrium is dropped, the set of Nash equilibria is a non-empty complete lattice under
pointwise partial order by a simple application of the Veinott’s (1992) or Zhou’s (1994)
version of Tarski’s theorem. In such a case, one can weaken the payoff continuity
assumption to merely upper semi-continuity of r on A, as well as drop the order
continuity Assumption 4(iv). The assumption that players are represented by a measure
space requires additional continuity type assumptions on player payoffs, the feature
that is not present in games with strategic complementarities and a finite number of
players.
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Fourth, the partial order imposed on M(Λ × S), and used in Assumption 4, is
defined “everywhere”, i.e., f ′ ≥ f iff ∀(α, s) ∈ Λ × S, f ′(α, s) ≥ f (α, s). This
actually is important to note. Alternatively, we could consider the case where we relax
the order to a.e., i.e., f ′ a.e. f iff f ′(α, s) ≥ f (α, s), λ⊗μ-a.e. For this alternative
partial order, a few important comments should be noted. First of all, for this latter
partial order, if we let Mˆ(Λ × S) denote the set of equivalence classes of functions
in M(Λ × S) with respect to λ ⊗ μ, then (Mˆ(Λ × S),a.e.) is a complete lattice
(see Vives 1990, Lemma 6.1), but the greatest and the least element in Mˆ(Λ × S) is
unique only up to equivalence classes. Additionally, the assumption concerning single-
crossing differences of r in (a, f ) with respect to a.e. is significantly stronger in
this case when compared with obtaining monotonicity in the “everywhere” pointwise
order. In particular, in such a situation, for f a.e. f ′, we have BR( f ) = BR( f ′).
Such assumption is satisfied, for example, in a class of aggregative games. Further,
in this latter partial order, the set of Nash equilibria of Γ is a non-empty, complete
lattice of Mˆ(Λ × S), and ,in this case, we do not require the (order-) continuity
assumption in Assumption 4(iv) imposed on payoffs. However, equilibria will also only
be characterized relative to equivalence classes. Hence, with a stronger assumption
concerning the order in which r has single-crossing differences, we can work with
weaker continuity properties of extremal best reply maps and recover a complete lattice
of equilibria (as opposed to a countably chain complete partial order set of equilibria).
Finally, as argued in the remainder of the paper, analyzing games on equivalence
classes of functions is straightforward in many applications.30
4.3 Monotone comparative statics
Similarly to the literature concerning complete information quasi-supermodular games
with a finite number of players, we may consider a parameterized version of the game
defined above and determine how its equilibria vary with respect to the parameter.
Along those lines, let Θ denote a partially ordered space of parameters θ . For any
fixed θ ∈ Θ , define game
Γ (θ) := {(Λ,L, λ), (S,S, μ), A, A˜(θ, ·), r(θ, ·){πα,Sα}α∈Λ}.
Therefore, for each θ , the game Γ (θ) is defined as in the first part of this section.
In order to determine comparative statics of equilibria of the game, we impose the
following assumptions.
Assumption 5 For any θ ∈ Θ , let Γ (θ) satisfy Assumption 4. Moreover, let
(i) A˜ be increasing in the Veinott strong set order on Θ and complete sublattice-
valued;31
30 For a related discussion on this point, see Vives (1990), Vives and Zandt (2007) and Van Zandt (2010),
who considered equilibria in ex-ante and interim strategies for a class of Bayesian games using equivalence
classes.
31 Sublatticed-valued is implied by ascending in Veinott’s strong set order; complete sublatticed-valued is
not.
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(ii) r have single-crossing differences jointly in (a, θ);
(iii) family {Δ(·, s)}s∈S , with Δ(θ, s) := r(θ, α, s, f (·, s), a′)− r(θ, α, s, f (·, s), a),
obey the signed-ratio monotonicity for any two a′, a ∈ A, a′ ≥ a and f ∈
M(Λ × S).
The next result follows from Corollary 10. For any θ ∈ Θ , let f ∗(θ) (resp. f ∗(θ))
be the greatest (respectively, the least) equilibrium of Γ (θ).
Corollary 3 Let Assumptions 4 and 5 be satisfied. Then, f ∗(·) and f ∗(·) are increas-
ing on Θ .
Proof By Assumptions 4, 5, BR( f ) (respectively, BR( f )) is increasing in θ and
inf-preserving (respectively, sup-preserving). By Corollary 10, f ∗(·) and f ∗(·) are
increasing on Θ .
5 Applications and extensions
We now present some economic applications of our results. In particular, we discuss
applications to riot games (or binary choice games), beauty contest and common value
auctions. We should mention in particular the example on common value auctions as
being of particular interest, as this example shows how we can extend our results to
games with weaker forms of complementarities, as used for example, in the work of
Li Calzi and Veinott (1992).
5.1 Riot games
Our first example is a version of the riot game presented in Atkeson (2000), which is a
continuum version of a binary choice game in the sense of Brock and Durlauf (2001).
These games have also found extensive empirical applications in the recent literature
on analyzing the nature of equilibrium social interactions (e.g., see Blume et al. 2010;
Scheinkman Undated). The game studies the aggregate behavior of a potentially angry
crowd that faces the riot police with the mandate of quelling collective violent actions.
In this game, each of the demonstrators decides individually whether to fight the police
or not (i.e., riot or not). If enough people join the fight, the riot police is overwhelmed
by the rioters, and each rioter gets some loot W > 0. Otherwise, if the riot police
contains the riot, each rioter gets arrested with payoff L < 0. Individuals who choose
not to fight get a safe payoff of 0 in either situation.32
In our version of the game, the ability of the riot police to control the crowd depends
on the state of the world s ∈ S and is summarized by a function p : S → R, which
indexes the fraction of the crowd that must riot in order for the rioters to overwhelm
the police (collectively). To make this example more general, we assume that p may
take values outside the unit interval. Therefore, if p(s) > 1 the police always contain
the riot (regardless of the number of people joining the fight), while it always fails to
32 We should mention that this game is very closely related to the Diamond–Dybvig model of bank runs
that has been studied in Lucas (2011) and Vives (2012).
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contain the riot when p(s) < 0. We should mention, in the case p : S → [0, 1], some
trivial equilibria arise, as will be discussed later in this section.
5.1.1 Existence of equilibrium
Let (S,S, μ) be the measure space of the states of the world, and the private informa-
tion of each individual α be represented by a sub σ -field Sα generated by a countable
partition. Assume that each rioter, regardless of the state, chooses action a = 1 when
willing to join the fight, and a = 0, otherwise. Then, ∀ (α, s) ∈ Λ × A, we have
A˜(α, s) = {0, 1}. Moreover, let τ ∈ Tˆd be an equivalence class of functions defined
in Sect. 3, mapping set S into the set of all distributions on Λ × {0, 1}, denoted by D,
where τ({(α, a) ∈ Λ × A |a = 1}|s) is the measure of all players joining the riot in
state s. The ex-post payoff of each individual is r : Λ × S × D × A,
r(α, s, τ (·|s), a) := a [(W − L)χR(τ )(s) + L
]
,
where χ is the indicator function,33 with
R(τ ) := {s ∈ S|τ ({(α, a′) ∈ Λ × A|a′ = 1} |s) ≥ p(s)}.
It is easy to verify r(α, s, τ (·|s), a) has single-crossing differences in (a, τ ) for any
s ∈ S, as
(W − L)χR(τ )(s) + L ,
is increasing in τ(·|s) (in fact it is piecewise constant).
We next need to show that family of functions {Δ(·, s)}s∈S with Δ(τ, s) := r(α, s,
τ (·|s), a′) − r(α, s, τ (·|s), a) satisfies signed-ratio monotonicity for any a′, a ∈ A,
a′ ≥ a. In fact, we only need to show this condition holds when an agent changes
her strategy from a = 0 to a = 1 (as, otherwise, the condition holds trivially). Along
these lines, observe we have
Δ(τ, s) := (W − L)χR(τ )(s) + L .
so Δ(τ, s) < 0 only if χR(τ )(s) = 0. Then, for any s′, s ∈ S such that Δ(τ, s) ≤ 0
and Δ(τ, s′) > 0, and any two measures τ, τ ′ ∈ Tˆd , τ ′ Tˆ τ , we have
− Δ(τ, s)
Δ(τ, s′)
= − L
W
≥ −Δ(τ
′, s)
W
= − Δ(τ
′, s)
Δ(τ ′, s′)
.
Therefore, the signed-ratio monotonicity condition holds for {Δ(·, s)}s∈S , and
Assumption 1 is satisfied.
33 That is, χA(x) = 1 whenever x ∈ A, and χA(x) = 0 otherwise.
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Then, the interim payoff of an agent is
v(α, s, τ, a) :=
∫
εα(s)
a
[
(W − L)χR(τ )(s′) + L
]
πα(s
′|εα(s))dμ(s′),
where εα(s) is defined as in Sect. 3. By Theorem 1, there exists the greatest and the least
distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game (with respect to Tˆ ) defined as
in Sect. 3).
Next, we consider conditions for the existence of extremal Bayesian Nash Schmei-
dler equilibrium in the sense of Sect. 4. Let M(Λ × S) be a set of L ⊗ S-measurable
functions f : Λ × S → {0, 1} endowed with the pointwise order. In this setting, the
fraction of rioters that join the fight is given by ∫
Λ
f (α, s)λ(dα), which is pointwise
increasing in f . Define
F( f ) :=
⎧
⎨
⎩
s ∈ S
∣
∣
∣
∣
∫
Λ
f (α, s)λ(dα) ≥ p(s)
⎫
⎬
⎭
,
The ex-post payoff is then
r(α, s, f, a) := a[(W − L)χF( f )(s) + L].
Interestingly, this payoff function r(α, s, f, a) is not order continuous with respect
to f (hence, Assumptions 4 is not satisfied). Therefore, we cannot directly apply
Theorem 2 to obtain the existence of equilibrium in M(Λ × S).
However, if each players payoff is constant on any equivalence class of functions
and equal λ-a.e., there does exist an equilibrium in this game defined in the equivalence
classes of L⊗S-measurable functions. Moreover, the set of such equilibria constitutes
a complete lattice. Therefore, aside from highlighting how to check the conditions of
our theorems in an important class of examples, this example also shows the importance
of disguising partial orders in the context of Bayesian Nash–Schmeidler equilibrium
even per the question of existence.
Finally, we should note in some cases the largest and the greatest equilibrium of the
game might be trivial. Observe, once p : S → [0, 1], the equivalence class τ ∗ where
τ ∗({(α, a) ∈ Λ × A|a = 1}|s) = 1, μ-a.e., is the greatest equilibrium, while τ ∗ such
that τ ∗({(α, a) ∈ Λ × A|a = 0}|s) = 1, μ-a.e., is the least equilibrium.
5.1.2 Difficulties with uniqueness of equilibrium
One important question per the riot game concerns the uniqueness of equilibrium.34
In the original paper by Atkeson (2000), at the beginning of the game, a signal s ∈ S
34 For example, when considering the version of the riot game that coincides with Diamond and Dybvig’s
model of bank runs, an important question is when is the equilibrium unique. See Lucas (2011) for discussion
of the importance of this question. Unfortunately, as we show, the answer to this question is likely to be
negative.
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is drawn from the normal distribution. Then, each player α observes a distorted value
of the signal xα = s + ζα , where ζα is drawn from a normal distribution, identical and
independent among players. In Atkeson (2000), as well as Morris and Shin (2001),
equilibrium is defined by a cutoff signal x∗ at which each player is indifferent between
joining and withdrawing from the riot. Moreover, the probability of drawing x∗, given
state s is p(s), which implies that the measure of rioters in equilibrium is equal to the
strength of the police. Under certain assumptions imposed on distributions governing
s and ζα , Morris and Shin (2001) claim uniqueness of such equilibrium.
In our framework, the question of uniqueness of equilibrium poses two main ques-
tions. First, the proof by Morris and Shin (2001) is based on an ex-ante symmetry
of players whose expectations concerning s and xα before the game are identical. In
fact, knowing that players are symmetric and that the Law of Large Numbers holds
for continuum of players enables the agents to predict the cutoff value of the observed
signal. Furthermore, in our model, the players have incomplete information about the
true signal, which cannot be distinguished from other elements of the same set con-
tained in the sub σ -field, which makes the Bayesian inference about the true state of
the world different from the case when agents receive a distorted signal. As it turns
out, these two issues are crucial for uniqueness of equilibria in the presented game.
For the sake of this discussion, we shall concentrate on uniqueness in the symmetric
case of the game, where every player has the same sub σ -field. Since players do not
receive a distorted signal in our framework, we have to present an alternate definition
of an equilibrium to the one analyzed in Morris and Shin (2001) and Atkeson (2000).
In our understanding, an equilibrium is an element s∗ ∈ S, such that the expected
utility of each player is equal to zero, and the measure of rioters is equal to p(s∗).
We shall assume that the sub σ -algebra is generated for each player by a partition
of convex subsets in S, and that s is drawn from a normal distribution. We should
mention that even though the symmetric case of the game is very simple, it is easy to
show that the equilibrium is not unique.35 In order to prove this, assume that s∗ exists.
Then, since players are symmetric, and determining their strategy with the same cut
off value,
(W − L)Prob(s < s∗|ε(s∗)) + L = 0,
must hold. Thus, we have
Prob(s < s∗|ε(s∗)) = − L
W − L .
Since − LW−L ∈ (0, 1) and Prob(s < s∗|ε(s∗)) is continuous and increasing in s∗
on ε(s∗) and taking values from 0 to 1, then for every element ε(s∗) in the sub σ -
algebra Sα , there exists an element s∗ at which the interim payoff of players is equal
to zero. The agents are therefore indifferent between joining the riot and withdrawing.
Hence, as long, as p(s∗) ∈ [0, 1] for each element of the sub σ -algebra, there exists
35 In fact, the number of equilibria might even be equal to the number of elements constituting the base of
the sub σ -field of players.
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an equilibrium value s∗. The above argument also shows that in general, this game
has multiple equilibria.36
The same problem occurs, when analyzing equilibria defined on strategies of play-
ers, as in Sects. 3 and 4. Even in the simplest cases, the game exhibits multiple equi-
libria, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 1 Consider an example of a riot game where the set of signals is S = [0, 1],
and its elements are distributed uniformly. Measure of 12 of players is endowed with
a sub σ -field S1 = {∅, S}, while the information structure of the remaining players
is S2 = {∅, S, [0, 12 ), [ 12 , 1]}. The strength of the police is determined by an affine
function p(s) = 3s − 1. Eventually, let − LW−L = 12 .
The game has at least two equilibria. The least one:
τ ∗({(α, a) ∈ Λ × A|a = 1}|s) =
{ 1
2 for s ∈ [0, 12 ),
0 for s ∈ [ 12 , 1],
and the greatest one:
τ ∗({(α, a) ∈ Λ × A| a = 1}|s) =
{
1 for s ∈ [0, 12 ),1
2 for s ∈ [ 12 , 1].
Hence, even when we constrain our attention to very simple games, equilibria are not
unique.
5.2 Beauty contests
Consider a version of the beauty contest game (e.g., see Acemoglu and Jensen 2010).
Suppose that the true value of a firm is unknown, but the players (who constitute the
stock market) receive a common signal which has to be interpreted with respect to
their private information in order to evaluate the asset of interest. Given a signal s, each
player α makes a public prediction about the true value by announcing a ∈ A˜(α, s) ⊂
R, where A˜ is well defined and convex-valued. Every agent is both interested in being
close to his personal understanding of the signal, as well as to predictions of other
players. Hence, the ex-post payoff can be defined as
r(α, s, φ, a) := − [h(α, |a − H(α, s)|) + g(α, |a − G(α, φ))|)] ,
where h, g : Λ × R+ → R+ are concave and decreasing on R+, H : Λ × S → R
is L ⊗ S-measurable, G : Λ × D → Rn is L ⊗ D-measurable and increasing on D,
while εα(s) and πα(s′|εα(s)) are defined as in Sect. 3.
36 Also, when Sα = {∅, S}, there exists a unique equilibrium; however, apart from some trivial cases,
unique equilibria are very unlikely.
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Let Tˆd denote the set of equivalence classes of functions τ : S → D endowed with
ordering Tˆ defined in Sect. 3.1. The interim payoff of player α is then
v(α, s, τ, a) =
∫
εα(s)
r(α, s′, τ (·|s′), a)πα(s′|εα(s′))dμ(s′).
To show that under the above assumptions the interim payoff v has single-crossing
differences in (a, τ ), we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6 Let f : R → R be a decreasing, concave function. Then, for a convex
X ⊂ R and some S ⊂ R, the function g : X × S → R with g(x, s) := f (|x − s|) has
increasing differences in (x, s).
Under the above lemma, the ex-post payoff function r has increasing differ-
ences in (a, φ). Hence, it has single-crossing differences and the family of func-
tions {Δ(·, s)}s∈S , where Δ(τ, s) := r(α, s, τ (·|s), a′)−r(α, s, τ (·|s), a), satisfies the
signed-ratio monotonicity condition for any a′, a ∈ A. Therefore, Assumption 1 is
satisfied, and, by Theorem 1, the set of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibria admits
the greatest and the least element.37
Additionally, equilibrium in the game need not be defined on a space of distributions.
That is, once the mapping G is defined on M(Λ× S) and order continuous, the game
can be generalized as in Sect. 4, and we obtain the greatest and the least equilibrium
in the sense of Schmeidler (1973).
Finally, even though in our example the strategies of players are restricted to a
subset of R, the game can be extended to multi-dimensional strategy spaces. Let ‖ · ‖
denote a taxicab metric defined on Rn . As shown in Topkis (1998), f : X × T → R,
f (x, t) := − ‖x − t‖ is supermodular on X , and has increasing differences in (x, s)
on X × S [see Topkis 1998, see Example 2.6.2(g)].38 Hence, for any s ∈ S, H :
Λ × S → Rn and G : Λ × D → Rn , increasing on D,
r(α, s, φ, a) := − [‖a − H(α, s)‖ + ‖a − G(α, φ)‖] ,
is supermodular on A and has increasing differences in (a, φ). As a result, the assump-
tions stated in Sect. 3 for the existence of extremal distributional Bayesian Nash equi-
librium in strategies are now satisfied.
5.3 Common value auctions
Assume that a measure space of agents attends a sealed bid, common value, multiple-
unit, discriminatory auction. There is a measure G ∈ R+ of homogeneous objects
37 Note that our approach generalizes the example presented in Acemoglu and Jensen (2010), where the
aggregate G is defined by
∫
A aτ(s)(da), while in our case G might be any measurable, increasing function
mapping D to R+.
38 Interestingly, this statement is not true for any metric. For example, Euclidean metric is not supermodular
on its domain, as shown in Topkis (1998, Example 2.6.2(h)).
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which are auctioned, but each player may buy at most one unit of the good. The value
of each object is s ∈ S ⊂ R. Each player is able to perceive it only with respect to his
private knowledge.39
Let (S,S, μ) be a measure space of values of the good. Since the auction is dis-
criminatory, each player pays the price equal to his bid. In this case, let u(α, s, a)
denote the payoff of player α, when the value of the good is s and his winning bid
is a ∈ A˜(α, s). Assume u to be strictly decreasing in a and that every player with a
loosing bid receives payoff equal to zero. Finally, A is the set of all possible bids, and
A˜(α, s) ∈ A is a compact subset of R+. The interim payoff of each player is
v(α, s, τ, a) :=
∫
εα(s)
u(α, s′, a)χR(τ )(a, s′)πα(s′|εα(s))dμ(s′),
where χ is the indicator function, and
R(τ ) := {(a, s) ∈ A × S|τ({(α, a′) ∈ Λ × A|a′ ≥ a}|s) ≤ G}.
In the following example, we narrow down our interest solely to increasing functions
τ : S → D in Tˆd . Moreover, let εα(s) := [zα(s), zα(s)] for some increasing functions
z
α
and z
α
.
40
In the literature concerning quasi-supermodular specifications of auctions with
finite number of agents, quasi-supermodularity of the interim payoff function is
obtained typically through assumptions concerning the log-supermodularity of the
density function of types of players. Importantly, notice in this example, this is not
the case. In fact, it is straightforward to verify that u(α, s, a)χR(τ )(a, s) does not
have single-crossing differences in (a, τ (·|s)), as the strict inequalities that must be
checked for the standard single-crossing property are not preserved as τ(·|s) D-
increases; still, the weak inequalities are preserved. This latter implication corre-
sponds to the payoff u(α, s, a)χR(τ )(a, s) having join (but not meet) up-crossing
differences in (a, τ (·|s)).41 Moreover, the class of functions {Δ(·, s)}s∈S , where
39 For example, as in the case of an auction for government bonds, which have commonly known face
value, but each player is willing to estimate their future expected return, with this private estimate unknown.
40 Notice u(α, s, a)χR(τ )(a, s) is not continuous on A; rather it is upper semi-continuous. However, our
assumptions are sufficient to show that v has join up-crossing differences in (a, s) for any family {τ(·|s)}s∈S
that is stochastically increasing in s. As a result, the greatest best response is increasing in s. Further, as
S ⊂ R, this greatest best response is also measurable (as it is monotone). Then, the greatest best response
B maps spaces of stochastically increasing τ ’s ordered by FOSD into themselves, where the poset of
distributions ordered FOSD is also chain complete poset. Indeed, if f is increasing and bounded, then∫
S f (s′)τ (ds′|s) is increasing and bounded. As a result, both sup and inf operators over arbitrary chains
preserve this property. Hence, we can repeat the reasoning and results from the main body of this paper.
41 Let (S,≥S) be a poset. A function f : S → R is join up-crossing, if for any s, s′ ∈ S such that s′ ≥S s,
we have f (s) ≥ 0 ⇒ f (s′) ≥ 0. Let h, g : S → R be join up-crossing functions. We say that h and g
obeys join signed-ratio monotonicity if for any s, s′ ∈ S, s′ ≥ s,
(i) g(s), g(s′) < 0 and h(s) > 0 ⇒ − h(s)g(s) ≤ − h(s
′)
g(s′) ;
(ii) h(s), h(s′) < 0 and g(s) > 0 ⇒ − g(s)h(s) ≤ − g(s
′)
h(s′) .
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Δ(τ, s) := u(α, s, a′)χR(τ )(a′, s)−u(α, s, a)χR(τ )(a, s), satisfies only the join signed-
ratio monotonicity, for any a′, a ∈ A, a′ ≥ a.
Given these concerns, we explain the result under weaker conditions in the following
lemma.
Lemma 7 Let for all (α, s) ∈ Λ× S, u : Λ× S × A → R be decreasing on A. Then
u(α, s, a)χR(τ )(a, s)
has join up-crossing differences in (a, τ (·|s)), and the family {Δ(·, s)}s∈S, where
Δ(τ, s) := u(α, s, a′)χR(τ )(a′, s)−u(α, s, a)χR(τ )(a, s), satisfies the join signed-ratio
monotonicity for any a′, a ∈ A, a′ ≥ a.
By Theorem 3 and Lemma 3, there exists a well defined, isotone operator B defined
as in Sect. 3, with the greatest fixed point (say τ ∗). By definition, τ ∗ constitutes
the greatest distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium (in monotone strategies) of the
game. Since the operator B might not be well defined, nor isotone, it cannot be deter-
mined whether the least equilibrium exists.
Another issue that needs to be addressed is the computation of greatest distri-
butional Bayesian Nash equilibrium (in monotone strategies) τ ∗. As operator B is
inf-preserving, by Theorem 1, we have limn→∞ B
n
(t) = τ ∗, where t is the greatest
element of Tˆd . Hence, the operator approximates the distribution using a conceptually
simple monotone iterative procedure. This means that our method not only deter-
mines the existence of the greatest equilibrium, but also presents tools for its direct
computation. No similar result is available using purely topological methods.
Finally, one can modify the above game without affecting supermodular properties
of the auction in question. For example, if we assume that the final price paid by
winning agents is determined by some increasing aggregate H : D → A (e.g., the
average price of all winning bids or a quantile of the distribution of prices), then the
payoffs are given by
u(α, s, H(τ (·|s)))χR(τ )(a, s).
Given the above results, it is easy to verify that the join up-crossing differences in
(a, τ ) of the ex-post payoff function are preserved under aggregation. This implies
that all the previous results hold.
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6 Appendix
In this section, we present several auxiliary results applied in the main body of the
paper.
6.1 Aggregation of quasi-supermodular functions
First, we discuss the question of aggregation of quasi-supermodular functions. This
extends some ideas presented in Quah and Strulovici (2012). Throughout this section
let (X,≥x ) be a complete lattice.
Corollary 4 For anyα ∈ R+, two quasi-supermodular functions h, g : X → R+ sat-
isfy the signed-ratio quasi-supermodularity if and only ifαh+g is quasi-supermodular.
Proof First, we prove (⇐). Define α∗ = − g(y)−g(x∧y)h(y)−h(x∧y) , and without loss of generality
assume that h(y) > h(x ∧ y) and g(y) < g(x ∧ y). Then α∗[h(y) − h(x ∧ y)] +
[g(y)− g(x ∧ y)] = 0. Since α∗h + g is quasi-supermodular, we have α∗[h(x ∨ y)−
h(x)]+ [g(x ∨ y)− g(x)] ≥ 0 and h(x ∨ y) > h(x), as h is also quasi-supermodular.
By rearranging the inequality, we obtain
α∗ = −g(y) − g(x ∧ y)
h(y) − h(x ∧ y) ≥ −
g(x ∨ y) − g(x)
h(x ∨ y) − h(x) .
Next, we prove (⇒). Let α[h(y) − h(x ∧ y)] + [g(y) − g(x ∧ y)] ≥ (>)0. If
h(y) ≥ (>)h(x∧y) and g(y) ≥ g(x∧y), the conclusion is obvious since h, g are quasi-
supermodular on X . Now, assume without loss of generality that h(y) > h(x ∧ y),
and g(y) < g(x ∧ y). Then,
α ≥ −g(y) − g(x ∧ y)
h(y) − h(x ∧ y) ≥ −
g(x ∨ y) − g(x)
h(x ∨ y) − h(x) ,
and so α[h(x ∨ y)−h(x)]−[g(x ∨ y)−g(x)] ≥ (>)0, since h is quasi-supermodular
on X , which completes the proof.
Clearly, any two supermodular functions satisfy the signed-ratio monotonicity.
However, the above corollary allows us to determine a similar property for a sum
of two quasi-supermodular functions, where one is not necessarily supermodular.
Consider the following example.
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Example 2 Consider two functions, h, g : R2 → R, defined by
h(x, y) := (x + y)4 and g(x, y) := (x + y)[(x + y)2 + 1].
It is easy to verify that both functions are quasi-supermodular. In addition, g is super-
modular while h is not. Still, we will show that their sum remains quasi-supermodular.
Take any two unordered elements (x ′, y), (x, y′) in R2. Without loss of generality
let x ′ ≥ x, y′ ≥ y, with at least one of them being satisfied with a strict inequality.
Therefore, (x ′, y) ∨ (x, y′) = (x ′, y′), (x ′, y) ∧ (x, y′) = (x, y).
First, note that both g(x, y′) − g(x, y) > 0 and g(x ′, y) − g(x, y) > 0. Clearly,
h(x, y′) ≤ h(x, y) if and only if |x + y′| ≤ |x + y|. We need to verify, whether
−h(x, y
′) − h(x, y)
g(x, y′) − g(x, y) ≥ −
h(x ′, y′) − h(x ′, y)
g(x ′, y′) − g(x ′, y) ,
which is equivalent to showing that f (x) = − (x+y′)4−(x+y)4
(x+y′)3−(x+y)3+(y′−y) is decreasing in
x . Calculating the derivative of f with respect to x allows to verify that whenever
|x + y′| ≤ |x + y|, and hence |x ′ + y′| ≤ |x ′ + y|, the condition holds. Hence, g + h
is a quasi-supermodular function.
We should mention that the above result holds for any finite as well as any infinite
sum of functions obeying the signed-ratio quasi-supermodularity. We present appro-
priate corollaries with their proofs.
Corollary 5 Let {gi }mi=1 be a finite family of functions gi : X → R satisfying the
signed-ratio quasi-supermodularity. Then,
∑m
i=1 αi gi is quasi-supermodular on X
for αi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , m.
Proof We need to show G(x) = ∑mi=1 αi gi (x) is quasi-supermodular. For arbitrary
x, y suppose G(x) − G(x ∧ y) ≥ (>)0. We need to show that
G(x ∨ y) − G(y) ≥ (>)0 (10)
Let us divide a set of index into partition F1 := {i | gi (x) − gi (x ∧ y) > 0},
F2 := {i | gi (x) − gi (x ∧ y) < 0}, F3 := {i | gi (x) − gi (x ∧ y) = 0}. Then,
G(x) − G(x ∧ y) =
∑
i∈F1∪F2
αi (gi (x) − gi (x ∧ y)).
IfF2 = ∅ then by quasi-supermodularity of all gi the (10) is satisfied. is satisfied.
Assume F2 = ∅. Then, we can write G(x)−G(x ∧ y) = ∑(hk(x)−hk(x ∧ y)) where
all hi (x)−hi (x∧y) ≥ 0 and hi is a positive linear combination of at most two functions
g j .42 From Corollary 4 all hk are quasi-supermodular hence hk(x ∨ y) − hk(y) ≥ 0.
42 Take a function g j with the least absolute value g j (x) − g j (x ∧ y) and take other function gk with
opposite sign and β1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
g j (x) − g j (x ∧ y) + β(gk (x) − gk (x ∧ y)) = 0.
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As a result (10) holds. If G(x) − G(x ∧ y) > 0 then h j0(x) − h j0(x ∧ y) > 0 for
some j0 and the equation in (10) is strict. unionsq
Next, we will show that the above property is preserved under integration.
Corollary 6 Let g : X × S → R be quasi-supermodular on X for all s ∈ S such that
{g(·, s)}s∈S is a family of functions obeying the signed-ratio quasi-supermodularity.
Assume that for all x, the function g(x, ·) is bounded. Let (S,S, μ) be a measure
space, and g(x, ·) be S-measurable for all x ∈ X. Then, G(x) := ∫S g(x, s)dμ(s) is
quasi-supermodular on X.
Proof Define h(x, y; s) := g(x, s) − g(y, s). Since g is S-measurable and bounded
for all x , so is h. For x ′, x ∈ X denote Ih as a bounded interval containing a
union of a ranges of h(x, x ∧ x ′; ·) and h(x ∨ x ′, x ′; ·). This implies that there
exists a sequence {hn} of simple functions satisfying hn → h (pointwise), such that
hn(x, y; s) := ∑ni=1[g(x, si )− g(y, si )]χSni (t), where χ is the indicator function and{Sni |i = 1, . . . , n} is a partition of Ih with a mesh convergent to 0 as n → ∞. Then
by Corollary 5, hn satisfies hn(x, x ∧ x ′; s) ≥ (>)0 ⇒ hn(x ∨ x ′, x ′; s) ≥ (>)0.
Assume that
∫
S hn(x, x ∧ x ′; s)dμ(t) ≥ (>)0. By Corollary 5 this implies that∫
S hn(x ∨ x ′, x ′; s)dμ(s) ≥ 0, since in this case the integral is a finite sum. We claim
that
∫
S
h(x, x ∧ x ′; s)dμ(s) ≥ 0 ⇒
∫
S
h(x ∨ x ′, x ′; s)dμ(s) ≥ 0. (11)
Let hn → h pointwise. Consider two cases. If
∫
S h(x, x ∧ x ′; s)dμ(t) > 0, then
for sufficiently large n we have
∫
S hn(x, x ∧ x ′; s)dμ(s) > 0 and, consequently,∫
S hn(x ∨x ′, x; s)dμ(t) ≥ 0. This implies
∫
S h(x ∨x ′, x ′; t)dμ(s) ≥ 0. Alternatively,
if
∫
S h(x, x ∧ x ′; s)dμ(s) = 0, then for arbitrary  ≥ 0 and sufficiently large n, we
have  + ∫S hn(x, x ∧ x ′; s)dμ(s) > 0. Since  + g(·, s) is quasi-supermodular, and
adding a constant does not affect the signed-ratio quasi-supermodularity, we have
 +∫S hn(x ∨ x ′, x; s)dμ(s) ≥ 0. Consequently,
∫
S h(x ∨ x ′, x; s)dμ(s) ≥ −. Since
 is arbitrary, the proof of (11) is complete.
In particular, (11) implies
∫
S
h(x, x ∧ x ′; s)dμ(s) > 0 ⇒
∫
S
h(x ∨ x ′, x ′; s)dμ(s) ≥ 0. (12)
It is sufficient to prove that the strict inequality is preserved. If h(x ∨ x ′, x ′; s) ≥ 0 for
μ-a.e. s, the implication is trivial. Therefore, assume that there exists a s′, such that
h(x ∨ x ′, x ′; s′) < 0. Take β ∈ R+ such that
∫
S h(x, x ∧ x ′; s)dμ(s) + βh(x, x ∧
x ′; s′) > 0. By implication (12),
Then, h1(x) = g j (x) + β1gk (x). Next, we construct h2 repeating this procedure without function g j and
with (1 − β1)gk instead gk .
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∫
S
h(x ∨ x ′, x ′; s)dμ(s) + βh(x ∨ x ′, x ′; s′) ≥ 0.
Hence,
∫
S h(x ∨ x ′, x ′; s)dμ(s) > 0. The proof is complete.
The following results are taken from Quah and Strulovici (2012), who provide
analogous results for finite and infinite sums of single-crossing functions.
Corollary 7 For any α ∈ R, two single-crossing functions h, g : S → R satisfy the
signed-ratio monotonicity if and only if αh + g is a single-crossing function on S.
Corollary 8 Let F = { fi }mi=1 be a family of single-crossing functions fi : S → R,
satisfying the signed-ratio monotonicity. Then, ∑mi=1 αi fi is a single-crossing function
on S for αi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , m.
Corollary 9 Let f : X × S → R be a single-crossing function on X for all s ∈ S
such that { f (·, s)}s∈S is a family of functions obeying the signed-ratio monotonicity.
Let (S,S, μ) be a measure space, and f (x, ·) be S -measurable, for all x ∈ X. Then,
F(x) := ∫S f (x, s)dμ(s) is a single-crossing function on X.
The above results can be generalized to functions which are not single crossing, but
join up-crossing functions. In order to make the paper self-complete (per Example,
5.3 in the last section of the paper), we present the following result, being a special
case of Theorem 1 and corollary 11 in Li Calzi and Veinott (1992).
Theorem 3 Let, (X,≥X ) ⊂ R be a join complete lattice, and (S,≥S) be a poset.
Moreover, let f : X × S → R have join up-crossing differences in (x, s), x ∈ X,
s ∈ S. Then, for any s′ ≥ s, s′, s ∈ S,
∨
arg max
x∈X f (x, s
′) ≥
∨
arg max
x∈X f (x, s),
whenever both argmaxes are non-empty.
We omit the proof and proceed with the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Let f : S × T → R, and F := { f (·, t)}t∈T be a class of functions obeying
the join signed-ratio monotonicity. Then, Corollaries 7–9 hold with “single-crossing
functions” being replaced by “joint up-crossing functions.”
Proof We present only the counterpart of Corollary 7, as the other two are a straight-
forward modification of previous proofs.
Take h, g ∈ F , and s′, s ∈ S such that s′ ≥s s. Observe that if h(s′) and g(s′)
are greater or equal zero, the result is trivial. Thus, without loss of generality, it is
sufficient to show that the relation holds for some h(s) > 0, and g(s), g(s′) < 0.
First, we prove (⇐). Take α∗ ∈ R such that α∗g(s) + h(s) = 0. This implies
that α∗g(s′) + h(s′) ≥ 0. By rearranging the inequality (keeping in mind that g(s) is
strictly negative), we obtain
α∗ = −h(s)
g(s)
≤ −h(s
′)
g(s′)
.
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To prove (⇒), let
α ≤ −h(s)
g(s)
≤ −h(s
′)
g(s′)
,
and αg(s) + h(s) ≥ 0. Then, αg(s′) + h(s′) ≥ 0
6.2 Fixed points of monotone operators in countably complete posets
Markowsky (1976, Theorem 8) proves the following result.
Theorem 4 (Markowsky’s Fixed Point Theorem) Let f : X → X be isotone function,
and X a chain complete poset. Then, the set of fixed points of f is a chain complete
poset in an induced order. Moreover,
∨ {x ∈ X | x ≤ f (x)} is the greatest fixed point
and
∧ {x ∈ X | x ≥ f (x)} is the least fixed point of f .
Then, a direct implication of the Tarski–Kantorovich Theorem (see Dugundji and
Granas 1982, Theorem 4.2) assures the following.43
Theorem 5 (Tarski–Kantorovich Theorem) Let X be a countably chain complete
poset with the greatest (x) and the least element (x). Let f : X → X be an isotone
function. Then,
(i) if f is inf-preserving, then ∧ f n(x) is the greatest fixed point of f in X,
(ii) if f is sup-preserving, then ∨ f n(x) is the least fixed point of f in X.
We now present the following important corollary.44
Corollary 10 Let X be a countably chain complete poset with the greatest and least
elements and T a poset. If f : X × T → X is isotone (i.e., f (x ′, t ′) ≥ f (x, t)
whenever x ′ ≥ x and t ′ ≥ t ) and sup-preserving (resp, inf -preserving) on X, then
the mapping t → (t) (resp., t → (t)) is isotone, where (t) is the least fixed point
of f (·, t) and (t) is the greatest fixed point of f (·, t).
6.3 Proofs of other results
Proof (of Lemma 6) First, we prove that for any convex set X ∈ R, function h : X →
R, h(x) := f (|x |), is concave. Take any x ′, x ∈ X and α ∈ [0, 1]. Since X is convex,
αx + (1 − α)x ′ ∈ X . Then
f (|αx + (1 − α)x ′|) ≥ f (α|x | + (1 − α)|x ′|) ≥ α f (|x |) + (1 − α) f (|x ′|),
where the first inequality is implied by the triangle inequality and monotonicity of f ,
while the second follows from concavity of f .
43 For example, see Dugundji and Granas (1982), Theorem 4.2.
44 For the proof, see for example Balbus et al. (2014, Theorem 8).
123
Large games with strategic complementarities 241
Since h is concave, for any x ′, x ∈ X , where x ′ ≥ x , and s′ ≥ s such that h is well
defined,
h(x ′ − s′) − h(x − s′)
(x ′ − s′) − (y − s′) ≥
h(x ′ − s) − h(x − s)
(x ′ − s) − (y − s) ,
which implies that h(x ′−s′)−h(x−s′) ≥ h(x ′−s)−h(x−s). Since g(x, s) = h(x−s),
the proof is complete.
Proof (of Lemma 7) Take any a′ ≥ a, and τ ′ Tˆ τ . Assume that
u(α, s, a′)χR(τ )(a′, s) ≥ u(α, s, a)χR(τ )(a, s).
Since χR(τ )(a, s) is increasing and u is decreasing in a, this takes place either when:
(i) χR(τ )(a′, s) = 1 and χR(τ )(a, s) = 0; or (ii) χR(τ )(a′, s) = 0, and χR(τ )(a, s) = 0.
If (i), then r(α, s, a′) ≥ 0. As χR(τ )(a′, s) decreases in τ , χR(τ ′)(a, s) is equal to
1 or 0. If it is equal to 1, the implication is true. If it is equal to zero, the result also
holds. In case (ii) the result is trivial.
Next, we show that the family {Δ(·, s)}s∈S , where Δ(τ, s) := u(α, s, a′)χR(τ )(a′, s)
− u(α, s, a)χR(τ )(a, s), satisfies join signed-ratio monotonicity for any a′, a ∈
A, a′ ≥ a. Take any two s′, s ∈ S, and any a′ ≥ a in A, as well as τ ′ Tˆ τ in
Tˆd . Without loss of generality assume that
u(α, s, a′)χR(τ )(a′, s) ≥ u(α, s, a)χR(τ )(a, s),
as well as
u(α, s′, a′)χR(τ )(a′, s′) < u(α, s′, a)χR(τ )(a, s′),
and
u(α, s′, a′)χR(τ ′)(a′, s′) < χR(τ ′)(a, s′).
Observe that this only takes place when
χR(τ )(a
′, s′) = χR(τ )(a′, s) = 1,
and
χR(τ ′)(a
′, s′) = χR(τ ′)(a, s′) = 1,
hence, the denominator is constant. Since the nominator in the definition of the join
signed-ratio monotonicity is positive and decreasing, the condition holds for any arbi-
trary s′ and s.
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